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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS AND BELIEFS

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I. The development of religious institutions and beliefs may be logical or real.

1. Logical development is the explication of the content of a notion. Nothing new is added; it is like the opening of a closed hand. Such a development is consistent with the static, or mediæval, conception of the world, and is not unknown to the older theologians. In this sense of the word many of them would admit a development—e.g. of the Papacy, of Transubstantiation, of Sacramental Confession, of the devotion to the Blessed Virgin—from the less formally complete teaching and practice of an earlier age. But there is no process, they would maintain, in the notion; the change is not in the notion but in us. This proviso is essential. The full powers of the modern Papacy, we are taught, were conferred by Christ on Peter; and the Syllabus of 1907, in condemning the proposition that the apostle was ignorant that this was so, appears to reject the principle even of logical development—of which it would be truer to say that it is tolerated than that it is approved of,

by the official Church. Pius X carried this identity of dogma back into the legendary age of the Old Testament, attributing a knowledge of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin—defined in 1854—to the Hebrew patriarchs. Noah, he says, contemplates this mystery in the ark; Moses meditated upon it before the bush that burned in Horeb; David when he danced before the ark of the covenant. This is the language of a formal Encyclical (February, 1904), not the devout play of a pious imagination sporting over the sacred text.

2. Real development supposes a change not only in us but in the notion. The notion does not stand, a world of objective truth, motionless while the stream of life passes. No; bank and stream are alike in motion; all things flow. And the unity of the process is a unity of origin and direction, not of content; the waters are many, but they have one source and one goal.

What the Church takes to be logical are in fact, with few exceptions, real developments: the Mass or Eucharist, from the breaking of bread; Baptism, from the primitive immersion, which at once symbolized and coincided with spiritual regeneration; the decorous offices of our modern churches from the tumultuous assemblies described in the first Epistle to the Corinthians—"will they not say that you are mad?" Some of these developments are legitimate, some illegitimate; some temporary, some permanent; some technical, some part and parcel of a larger life-movement, such as—to take ethical examples—the abolition of slavery, the growth of humanitarianism, or feminism. Their germs are to be found in the New Testament; but they are found in a rudimentary shape, their emergence from which was dependent on a general replacement of lower by higher ideas.

It is obvious that the Eleatic unity postulated by Catholicism—I use the word in the European sense—has

no room for such developments. Hence the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to progress. It cannot, human nature being what it is, exclude it. But it admits it reluctantly, under protest, in as small doses as possible—and in hope of better days, when the concessions, extorted under pressure of necessity, may be withdrawn. The opposing forces are, or used to be, spoken of as the Pope and the Revolution; in 1860 Newman preached a famous sermon under this name. The Heraclitean flux calls, not indeed for the Pope, but for a certain ideal balance. “We may compare Parmenides and Heraclitus to two lofty and precipitous peaks on either side of an Alpine pass. Each commands a wide prospect, interrupted only on the side of its opposite neighbour. And the fertilizing stream of European thought originates with neither of them singly, but has its source midway between.”¹

II. Some years before his death Father Tyrrell, on re-reading Newman’s *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, wrote to a friend, “I came to the conclusion that it is a bad book.” By bad he meant sophistical and misleading; which no doubt it is. But it is also uniquely suggestive. We may apply to the writer Harnack’s criticism of Rudolf Sohm—that he has arrived *ex errore per veritatem ad errorem*. But, to be just, we must finish the sentence: “There are few books from which so much knowledge of early Church history may be gained.” For this is true, as of Sohm’s *Kirchenrecht*, so of Newman’s ingenious and paradoxical work.²

I am not sure that Tyrrell would now have insisted so strongly on the misleading tendencies of the *Essay on Development*. It is misleading; but it has to a great extent ceased to mislead. A certain number of people still become Catholics, hyphenated or un-hyphenated.

¹ The Greek Philosophers, A. W. Benn, p. 25.

² Dogmengeschichte, A. Harnack, I, 39.

They do so for many reasons—political, temperamental æsthetic; one only excepted—belief in Catholic doctrine; so that the Cardinal's theological argument does not touch them directly, while its drift, its affinities, and its large suggestiveness, are calculated to lead them by other paths to another goal.

At the time of its publication (1845) the book was a storm-centre. At Rome indeed it was known by hearsay only; since, as Newman's biographer informs us, "no theologian in the city read English with any fluency."³ But the American bishops denounced it as "half Catholicism, half infidelity." Mr. Gladstone wrote to Manning, then an Anglican, that "it placed Christianity on the edge of a precipice, from which a bold and strong hand would throw it over";⁴ while Bishop Thirlwall, with characteristic acumen, pointed out the underlying *petitio principii*—the assumption of the infallibility of the Roman Church; and insisted both on the fallacy of the reasoning—the features of Romanism on which it laid stress being developments indeed, but illegitimate developments or corruptions—and on the dangers to which this reasoning opened the way. There is no abuse or social evil which might not, he says, be defended on the ground that it had arisen gradually out of earlier conditions to which little or no exception could be taken; and of the Essay as a whole, "The singular combination of the extremes of scepticism and credulity which it exhibits to a degree almost without precedent will not recommend it to those who value either freedom of thought or earnestness of faith."⁵

Newman did not invent the theory of Development. But he formulated it with the skill of a great dialectician and the art of a great man of letters; he gave it currency,

³ Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, W. Ward, I, 159.

⁴ Life of Cardinal Manning, E. S. Purcell, I, 315.

⁵ Charge of the Bishop of St. Davids, 1848.

and the prestige of his name. The Essay disposed once for all of the *Semper Eadem* conception of Christianity then common to Catholics and Protestants. "You are not primitive," was the charge brought against Rome by Anglican and Puritan alike. Newman was too well informed and too astute to deny it. He met it by an effective *tu quoque*: "Neither are you." But, however effective as an answer to the appeal from Trent to Nicæa and Ephesus, the argument fell flat when the appeal was carried back from all three—from Pope and Church and Council—to Christ, while it led by a fatal sequence of ideas to that larger conception of Development as a law of life, for which religion at any given point is a stage in a process and provisional: "Behold, the feet of them which have buried thy husband are at the door, and shall carry thee out." It is impossible to suppose that so acute a mind as Newman's was blind to these applications of his theory; or to the results to which, when thus applied, it led. But it was no business of his to indicate them. He used it for a particular purpose; and with a certain recklessness—for indeed it was like striking a match in a powder magazine—he did not look beyond this end.

III. The Reformation strengthened the controversial element in religion at the expense of the scientific. The Protestant was in need of a breakwater against the flood of superstition which had overrun the Church; and in the Bible, the inspired record of an earlier stage of revelation, with which mediæval religion was irreconcilable, he found one. The Catholic was in search of a short and easy method of silencing the innovators who threatened the destruction of Christianity as he understood it; the Vincentian maxim, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, lay ready to his hand. History was fatal to each disputant; a world in movement refused to be measured by fixed standards. It was not true that

"the Bible, and the Bible only, was the religion of Protestants"; it was not true that the Catholicism of Trent was identical with that of Nicæa, or that either was identical with the Christianity of the first age. Newman started with an admission of this divergence; he replaced the authorized and accustomed, "You change; therefore you are in error," by the revised, "Here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."⁶ This, though he was not a Modernist, made him the father of Modernism, and explains the condemnation of his distinctive positions, though their source is not named, in the Syllabus of Pius X.

It is not surprising that not a few Protestants should be disposed, on the face of it, to go with the Pope—who has more disciples than we might suppose outside his own communion. For the Papacy represents, amongst other things, that fixed determination not to think, which is characteristic of the intellectually unregenerate in—and outside—all the Churches, and which cuts them off so effectually from the things of mind and the movement of spirit. It is not that they do not know, or even that they do not want to know. Either might be pardoned. But they go further; they want, and are resolved, not to know. The difficulty presented by the Development theory is one to which the answer is, *Solvitur ambulando*. For Christianity *has* developed. It is only by a large admission of this development that the institutions and beliefs of any modern Church can be defended; the starting-point of the apologist is that "from the beginning it was not so." The process is unceasing; it grows while men sleep. But there are times when it is catastrophic. In the second century, in the sixteenth, and again in the eighteenth, Christianity was reconstructed almost out of recognition. *Nec tamen consumebatur*; the bush burned with fire, but was not consumed.

⁶ Development, p. 10.

IV. The first of these reconstructions presents itself to us today under the form of eschatology, and in an ethical as much as, perhaps even more than, in a theological shape. It was a saying of Father Tyrrell's that Christian ethics needed criticism as urgently as Christian dogma; and the situation has developed quickly. We are faced by the ethical problem which he foresaw. The criticism of institutions and beliefs has been settled, and settled in one sense. I do not mean that this sense has been universally accepted. It has not. But, with those who count, the question has passed out of the province of discussion. Its general acceptance is a matter of time—shorter or longer; perhaps longer; but the decision will not be revised. The criticism of ethics is still in the making. It has to be thought out and to justify itself, to find its proper methods and form.

V. One thing, however, the eschatologists have taught us: that it is hopeless to attempt to understand primitive Christianity till we have ceased to look at it from the standpoint of the Christianity of our own day. If we think we find the tenets or practices of any modern Church, our own included, among the first Christians, we deceive ourselves: they belong to earlier strata, which, with their fauna and flora, have long since disappeared. Primitive Christianity had three main features: (1) Enthusiasm, (2) the belief in the Parousia, (3) the opposition between Palestinian and Pauline religion—"my Gospel," as St. Paul calls it, and that of "them that were of repute."

(1) Enthusiasm has, for good or for evil, become foreign to us. The Church of Rome exploits it; the Church of England patronizes it; the Free Churches coquet with it—at a safe distance. But any such attitude is an absolute disqualification for the understanding of early Christianity, for the early Christians were enthusiasts to a man. They spoke with tongues; they worked and

experienced wonders; they prophesied; they saw visions and dreamed dreams. "No one," says Jowett, perhaps not without a touch of irony, "No one can read the ninth chapter of the First or the eleventh and twelfth chapters of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, without feeling how different the Apostle St. Paul must have been from good men among ourselves."⁷

(2) The belief in the literal and immediate Coming of Christ is the key to the Church of the First Age. It accounts for its distinctive features, and explains the absence of much that, looking back from later standpoints, we expect to find in it but do not find. Conceive a community animated by it; what a revolution in feeling, thought, and conduct, would follow! For us life as a whole rests on the assumption that our environment is, relatively at least, permanent; that today will be succeeded by tomorrow, tomorrow by the day after, and so on indefinitely. The removal of this assumption could not but withdraw men from the ordinary duties of life. The ethical outlook would be revolutionized—not always in the interest of ethics. Renan's *Abbesse de Jouarre* shows that the shadow of the impending end does not necessarily act either as a sedative to passion or as a deterrent from its indulgence; it makes one man a fanatic, another a debauchee. But in either case those who live in it live for the moment. The Christians of the first days did so. They withdrew from public life—*infructuosi in negotio*, was the reproach directed against them; they made no provision for the future. The late organization of the Church, the fluidity of her standards, teaching, and observance for more than a century, the gap between the literature of the Apostolic and that of the post-Apostolic age—these things which are so unaccountable and so perplexing to us are the natural consequence of the attitude of intense expectation in which they lived.

⁷ St. Paul's Epistles, I, 174.

The questions discussed among us today—the nature of the Church, the origin of the sacraments and the ministry, the manner in which Christ entered into and left this world—would have had no meaning for them. Those of them even who had known Christ after the flesh knew Him so no longer. What great importance was to be attached even to the most sacred events of this world, if it was so soon to be lost in another? Why make provision for the Church of the future—her government, her worship, her theology—when the Church of the present was—today it might be—to greet her returning Lord?

(3) With regard to Palestinian and Pauline Christianity, we are coming to see that the reaction against Tübingen has been carried very much too far. "Baur's outline of the process through which the nascent faith attained to full self-consciousness as a world-religion required correction rather than disproof," says Professor Bacon; while "for the clearer definition both of the task and the methods of criticism reached by the concentration of attention upon the contrast between the Petrine and the Pauline conception of 'the Gospel,' we owe a lasting debt to the Tübingen school."⁸ It is a safe maxim never to take a reaction without a large, a very large, discount; reactions invariably overshoot the mark. Had Palestinianism prevailed, Christianity would have degenerated into a sect under "a caliphate in the family of Jesus," overweighted with Jewish particularism and crushed under the burden of the Law.

VI. Such was primitive Christianity. It was short-lived; before the middle of the second century it had disappeared. And it had disappeared so completely that we cannot now even imagine it—a charismatic religion, for which a tribal theology is an open question and the end of all things imminent. The picture of the Day of

⁸ The Making of the New Testament, pp. 41-43.

the Lord in 1 Thessalonians 4 14-17 is prophecy, and literal, not symbolic. We do not think, we have ceased even to dream, in this way. Nor is this the paradox that Newman in a famous passage—"Strange antitype indeed to the early fortunes of Israel!"—conceives it.⁹ For the most important events came about silently, unbidden, and unforbidden, in virtue of the natural process of change incident to human life and intercourse. When the brotherhood became a World-Church, an action and reaction set in which transformed it; the change without followed upon and reflected the change within. The wonder would have been had it *not* been so. Reconstruction was a condition of continuance; primitive Christianity perished, says Harnack, that Christianity might survive.

But the reconstruction was radical. Christianity ceased to be what it had been; and became what it had not been. Few even today realize the extent to which this was so. Formerly fewer still were in a position to do so. The Reformers of the sixteenth century appealed against the mediæval Church to the Fathers. The tribunal was vague and uncertain. On points of detail the appeal was often—though by no means invariably—successful; full-fledged mediævalism was a development, and one of slow growth. But these early authors spoke in various and inconsistent accents. The unanimous *consensus patrum*, whether invoked by Bellarmine or Bull, was non-existent; the writings appealed to were "a great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts." They served, no doubt, often enough to embarrass a Catholic controversialist; he was caught in the net that he laid. But it is foolish to try to establish a Scriptural, reasonable, and reformed Christianity upon them; to accept the first eight, or six, or four Councils is to find oneself deep in the mire. For by the end of the second century the

⁹ Historical Sketches, I, 418.

premises of mediævalism had established themselves in Christendom, and it is a mistake to think that the earlier stages of the system were the least mischievous. A writer whose knowledge of the patristic period is exceptional argues that "if particular points be had in view, it may be affirmed that Popery is a practicable form and a corrected expression of the Christianity of the Nicene age."¹⁰

VII. For one function of the Papacy in history—it is not, of course, its only function—has been that of restraining. In this, as in so many other respects, it has shown itself "the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire"; "He who now letteth will let until he be taken out of the way." Rome has never been, and is not now, a school either of piety or of learning. It has been indifferent to both. Seldom has it looked away from what has been at once its aim and its achievement—the building up of the universal Papal monarchy. It has used theology and religion as means, and secondary means, to this end. When the Popes have persecuted, it has been in the interests not of orthodoxy but of their own absolutism; when they have encouraged fanaticism, it has not been with the desire, however misdirected, of promoting religion, but because they could not afford to alienate the support of the vulgar, who insisted upon being, and were, deceived. They have never wanted saints to put in the foreground—a Francis of Assisi, a Xavier, a Curé d'Ars. But the men behind the scenes, who pulled the wires on which these parade-figures danced, were not saints but astute and unscrupulous politicians, bent on securing secular ends by any and every means. Popular superstition runs ahead of authority and of dogma. The attitude of Rome, even under Pius IX, to the famous shrine of Lourdes was characteristic. It was that rather of Pilate than of Caiaphas; it opposed the novel

¹⁰ Ancient Christianity, 1840, I, 63.

and equivocal devotion, though it did not oppose it very resolutely or for very long. And the growth of miracle among the Catholic populations of the South is so prolific that ecclesiastical authority finds itself compelled to prune it rigorously; for one case in which it escapes suppression in nine it is successfully suppressed. It was in this sense that the earlier Popes acted. Their action followed up, embodied, and legalized certain opinions and practices which were already prevalent in an undefined form. But it rarely pushed on in advance of popular feeling and usage; on the contrary it followed in the wake of ancient superstitions, and expressed the inherited prejudices of the community in enactments which were often of a corrective and qualifying kind.

VIII. The Nicene age saw the rise of the hierarchy, of sacramentalism, of asceticism, of saint-worship, of miracle-mongering. Such were the results of the diffusion of Christianity, of the various cultural levels of its adherents, of contact with secular civilization; the gold became dim. For the cosmopolitan culture of the time was in a state of decadence, not to say decomposition. A turbid flood of Oriental mysticism had overrun the exhausted soil of Græco-Roman philosophy; thaumaturgy did duty for science, theosophy for speculation, asceticism for ethics. At its best the patristic period was a Silver Age; at its worst it was one of very base metal. The interminable Trinitarian and Christological controversies of the fourth century, when we have read into them all that we can—and much that we cannot—leave an impression of aridity; and the later Scholasticism, “lies between us at our present station in the world and the immediate diffusion of the truth from heaven as ‘the morning spread upon the mountains’—an atmosphere of mist through which the early beams of Divine Light have been diffused.”¹¹ Not without many a

¹¹ Bishop Hampden, Bampton Lectures, 1832, p. 8.

strange refraction. The light was not broken only, but distorted; outlines were blurred, proportion was destroyed, perspective lost.

No later construction of Christianity can compare either in extent or in significance with that which took place when the New Testament community developed into the Church of the Fathers; nor can any that is conceivable in the future take so radical a shape. The word "pathological" should be avoided; the change was brought about by the circumstances and requirements of the time. This was at once its sufficient reason, and—for though it was not the best, it was probably the best possible, given the situation—its justification. And if so fundamental and momentous a change could take place in the morning of Christianity, when it stood fresh from its Founder's hand, is it possible to limit the reconstructions of later days on the ground that they are reconstructions? The question is not, Are they reconstructions? but, Are they reconstructions imposed upon us by the necessities and in the interests of the community? by veracity? by charity? by prudence? For "against such there is no law." The authority for this position goes back to the first and greatest of Christian mystics—the author of the Fourth Gospel, the 14th, 15th and 16th chapters of which are conclusive. No religious founder ever left so much to be done by his followers as Christ. Psychology confirms it; "ideas do not enter the world of reality unharmed." History demonstrates it; Christianity has changed, is changing, and will continue to change. It is, says Rothe, *das Allerveränderlichste; das ist sein besonderer Ruhm*.

IX. The Reformation swept away much that for its generation was of the very heart of Christendom—the extension of the Incarnation in the Mass; the forgiveness of sins in sacramental confession; the eternal feminine presented by the cultus of the Blessed Virgin. "O

God, the heathen are come into thine inheritance!" was the cry of piety. To this day simple Catholics find it difficult to regard Protestantism as Christianity at all. Yet the change from mediæval to Reformation Christianity was as inevitable as, and less difficult to justify than, that from primitive to Nicene. The new wine burst the old bottles. The clergy were no longer either better or wiser than the laity. The invention of printing had brought the Bible to the people, and the contrast between biblical and ecclesiastical religion was palpable; the Renaissance had brought to light the forgotten values of the classical world. Times of stress and strain, take what shape they will, are unfavorable to piety, which is a tender plant and loves the shade. But they are not to be envied who can read the Acts of the Reformation martyrs—Bradford, Taylor, Cranmer—unmoved; or who do not instinctively class a George Herbert, a John Bunyan, and a Samuel Rutherford with the worthies of Catholic Christendom. The saints, wherever found, have one language, which men of goodwill, being "taught of God," recognize; "We do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful works of God." I remember hearing the late excellent Father Maturin speak with characteristic candor and generosity of the intellectual and religious possibilities of a position with which his personal convictions forbade him to associate himself—that of Liberal and Evangelical Protestantism. When a man's eye is single, his sight is clear.

X. The Illumination carried things a stage further. The movement is so closely associated with that of the French Encyclopædists—their intolerance of convention; their hatred of tyranny, civil and religious; their philosophic ardor; their corrosive wit—that the extent to which it influenced the Churches is forgotten. But it was great. The age was one of Reason. Nature, Man, God—all were reasonable; in religion, as in speculation,

the appeal was to the light within. For this light was of divine kindling; "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." Reason therefore "is the Divine Governor of the universe," said Whichcote; "to go against reason is to go against God."

In 1785 Paley dedicated his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* to the then Bishop of Carlisle:

"Your Lordship's researches [he says] have never lost sight of one purpose; namely, to recover the simplicity of the Gospel from beneath that load of unauthorized additions, which the ignorance of some ages and the learning of others, the superstition of weak and the craft of designing men, have (unhappily for its interest) heaped upon it. And this purpose, I am convinced, was dictated by the purest motive; by a firm and, I think, a just opinion, that whatever renders religion more rational, renders it more credible; that he who, by a diligent and faithful examination of the original records, dismisses from the system one article which contradicts the apprehension, the experience, or the reasoning of mankind, does more towards recommending the belief, and with the belief the influence of Christianity, to the understandings and consciences of serious enquirers, and through them to universal reception and authority, than can be effected by a thousand contenders for creeds and ordinances of human establishment.

When the doctrine of Transubstantiation [he continues] had taken possession of the Christian world, it was not without the industry of learned men that it came at length to be discovered that no such doctrine was contained in the New Testament. But had those excellent persons done nothing more by their discovery than abolished an innocent superstition or changed some directions in the ceremonial of public worship, they had merited little of that veneration with which the gratitude of the Protestant Churches remembers their services. What they did for mankind was this: they exonerated Christianity of a weight which sunk it. If indolence or timidity had checked these exertions, or suppressed the fruit and publication of these enquiries, is it too much to affirm that infidelity would at this day have been universal? At a time when some men appear not to perceive any good, and others to suspect an evil tendency, in that spirit of examination and research which is gone forth in Christian countries, this testimony is become due."

Thus Paley. Today another spirit animates English Churchmen. I can think of only one living bishop who could be addressed, without irony, in such words. It is to be regretted, it is greatly to be regretted, that this is so. Vision and tradition vary in inverse proportion. And, "where there is no vision, the people perish"; the blind lead the blind. No gifts, however excellent, of another order can avert the inevitable results of such leadership.

"La plus sage des politiques, la plus généreuse sollicitude pour les classes populaires n'assureraient pas chez nous l'avenir du catholicisme, si le catholicisme, qui, étant une religion, est d'abord une foi, se présentait sous les apparences d'une doctrine et d'une discipline opposées au libre essor de l'esprit humain, déjà minées pas la science, isolées et isolantes au milieu du monde qui veut vivre, s'instruire et progresser en tout."¹²

XI. In our own time the question of Development has again become one of the first importance. For "we see not our tokens." The old stars are set; the new are not yet risen. We are

"Wandering between two worlds—one dead,
The other powerless to be born."

Neither the Bible nor the Church present themselves to us in the traditional perspective. And the historical sanctities of Christendom are faded; the outlines of its sacred figures are confused. More important still, the point of view has shifted. Not more surely did Copernicus give a new orientation to science, or Kant to speculation, than criticism does to religious knowledge. As long ago as 1857 Archbishop Temple wrote, "Our theology has been cast in a scholastic mould, i.e. based on logic. We are in need of and we are gradually being forced into a theology based on psychology. The transi-

¹² Autour d'un petit livre, A. Loisy, p. xxxv.

tion, I fear, will not be without pain; but nothing can prevent it. To make the study of divinity real and not in some degree unsettling, seems to me simply impossible.”¹³ The last two generations present us with a commentary on these prophetic words. People do not now ask, “Is Christ of one substance with the Father?” or, “Is it part of the notion of Christ that He is so?”; but “How did men come to believe that He was of one substance with the Father?”; “How did they come to think in this way?”; though it must be remembered that the logical, or metaphysical, element in thought is not got rid of by being seen in a changed perspective. *Expellas furca; tamen usque recurret.* For mind is part of the universe, akin to, and ultimately in accord with, the system of things.

The “original or birth-sin” of theology is that, instead of constructing its conceptions out of its facts, it constructs its facts in accordance with its conceptions; by a *tour de force*, and with unhappy results. For it becomes the victim of a perverse and misapplied logic; and false to its nature, it becomes a principle of exclusion, not a law of love. It anathematizes the Western because he admits, and the Eastern because he rejects, the *Filioque*. It unchurches the Quaker, because he is unbaptized; the Anglican, because he is separated from the Papacy; the Presbyterian, because he is not episcopally ordained. It insists on a theory of inspiration of which Scripture knows nothing; on an ecclesiasticism with which it is inconsistent; on a Christology abstract, arbitrary, and imported from without into the text. For there are three distinct Christologies in the New Testament: that of the Synoptics, in which a still earlier stage is indicated; that of St. Paul; and that of St. John; while the formulated dogma of the Councils is the product of

¹³ Memoirs of Archbishop Temple, II, 517.

reflection on testimony and data which could be, and history shows were, interpreted in more than one sense. To think in this way is to be exposed to grave confusion. It is dangerous, e.g., to argue that because Christ was God, He *must* have done this or *could not* have done that. This is to lay a trap for consciences; we do not know. For "no man hath seen God at any time"; we have "neither heard His voice, nor seen His form." The path of experience is safer. Christ did, taught, suffered as it is written; *therefore* His being God is not inconsistent with these things. The mysterious events which took place concerning Him before the Gospel history, properly so called, opened and after it closed, have recently become matter of discussion. It was inevitable, the state of knowledge being what it is, that this should be so, and complaints are useless. But the ground is holy. Fra Angelico painted the Son and the Mother on his knees. "Il serait bien," says Renan, "que la critique fit de même, et ne bravât les rayons de certaines figures, devant lesquelles se sont inclinés les siècles, qu'après les avoir adorées."¹⁴ But one thing we must neither think nor say; it is this—that because Christ was God, it follows either that He was born, as other men are not born, out of the course of nature, or that the wonder of the First Easter took place as an event in place and time. It does not follow, and it is suicidal to say so; these questions must be argued on other grounds. What is essential in Christ is neither speculative subtlety nor historical detail, but the divine mediation. "There is one Mediator between God and man, Himself man, Christ Jesus; who gave Himself a ransom for all."¹⁵

XII. The Liberal Churchman is made at times to feel himself "an alien unto his mother's children"; "fat bulls of Bashan close him in on every side." He belongs, he is told, to "the Sterile Party"; he is "a literary clergy-

¹⁴ Les histoires critiques de Jésus, 133.

¹⁵ 1 Timothy 2 5.

man, with an interest in theology"—surely this is better than being an illiterate clergyman, with no interest in theology? he is "not constructive"—people who do not know what construction is are always insisting on this; or, "what he says is true, but he is not in a position to say it"; he is "out of place among the clergy, or in the Church." What a conception of religion such a view implies! One has heard of the French *catholiques athées*. Religion, says Crabbe, "often fears her friends." But when he looks round, he may take courage. In his lifetime Calvinism, that black shadow upon English religion, has disappeared. Who now, with St. Augustine, regards the virtues of the antique world as "splendid vices"? or supposes, with our thirteenth Article, that works done before justification "have the nature of sin"? A once popular religious writer described the lost as abandoned "to the inventive fury of an omnipotent and infuriated God." Who would not now put down such sentiments as insane and blasphemous? So eminent a man as Newman writes of the fierce tribesmen of Israel who extirpated Amalek root and branch, slaughtering in cold blood man and woman, infant and suckling, "Doubtless, as they slew those who suffered for the sins of their fathers, their thoughts turned first to the sin of Adam, and next to that unseen state where all inequalities are righted."¹⁶ Today, in the humblest conventicle, such words would rouse deserved indignation and contempt. We resent the pious hubristics of the *Church Times*; not always perhaps without reason. It is not a very amiable or a very cultivated organ; in moments of irritation one is tempted to apply to it Dryden's criticism of Elkanah Settle, a minor dramatist of the Restoration: "His style is boisterous and his prose incorrigibly lewd." But the tyranny of the *Record* was, in its day, as oppressive and very much more powerful. And the

¹⁶ Plain and Parochial Sermons, III, 187.

movement whose dregs the *Church Times* represents is a declining movement. The Dean of St. Paul's tells us that it "must soon begin to break up, owing to certain internal contradictions which the enthusiasm of its adherents has hitherto masked or ignored."¹⁷ It has, however, rendered an important service to English religion, though this service does not consist in the revival of mediæval belief and ceremonial with which it is associated. Rather it will be found in the accentuation of the community-element in the assent of faith. We do not come to Christianity from without or as isolated and individual units; if we did, I do not know what our judgment on it would be. But we approach it as heirs of a Christian civilization, as citizens of a Christian nation, as members of a world-wide Christian community or Church. This sense of community is to us what the proof from miracles or prophecy was to a former generation. Protestantism tends to lose sight of it—to the injury of religion; Catholicism tends to emphasize it—to its gain.

XIII. A few years ago the Free Church of Scotland gave us a memorable lesson in the development inherent in and inseparable from a living Christian community. The real question at issue in the prolonged litigation which began in the Scottish Courts in 1900 and ended in the House of Lords in 1904 was, what constitutes a Church? To the contention of the minority, known as the "Wee Frees," that the identity of a Church consisted in the identity of its doctrine—they protested, consistently enough, against the Declaratory Act adopted in 1891 by the General Assembly—the representatives of what is now the United Free Church answered that this was not so; that a Church had power "to legislate upon, and so to change doctrine"; that it "might adopt a new Confession of Faith." The one limit was its own notion.

¹⁷ The Churchman, February, 1912.

To change, it must be the Church; and it would cease to be so did it repudiate the two conditions necessary to its own conception—"the Headship of Christ, and His word as its only rule."¹⁸ If this were not so, if the unity of the Church consisted in creed-content, not in persistence and permanence of direction, we should still be teaching the imminence of the Second Advent; the Millennium; the powerlessness of the Church to remit sin after baptism; the damnation of the unbaptized; verbal inspiration; the duty of persecution; a penal, arbitrary, and endless hell. Static religion is "seeming wise" and seeming pious; we must "launch out into the deep."

"But [says a great Scottish Churchman] this assertion of freedom is not of the kind that fosters arrogance; rather it is akin to reverence and godly fear. We have much to hold fast. We are conscious, by God's grace, of our possession of a great body of doctrine, which through the word and also through the providence of God in the history of the Churches, through the fidelity of martyrs and fathers, through the great return to Scripture of the Reformation, through many particular conflicts and revivals, became clear and dear to our fathers, and has become so also to us. We value the life and the traditions we inherit, though we refuse, and we need to refuse, to place them in the room of our living Head or of His word. We own some benignant purpose of God in the genealogy of Church life in which He has cast our lot, and in the peculiar influences which are derived to us from past history. We are not insensible to this; we are not tired of it; but it must not run into idolatry. We desire to draw from our history, for ourselves and those who come after us, all the good it has carried with it. We are not ashamed of our fathers. But they taught us that one is our Head, even Christ, and that this holds not only for the individual Christian, but for the Church, for that peculiar society which He created and has promised to sustain."¹⁹

These weighty words of Principal Rainy put the question on its proper level. It is a high one. The loyalty of the Christian is not to the traditions of men, but to the truth of Christ.

¹⁸ Free Church of Scotland Appeals, p. 545. Edinburgh, 1904.

¹⁹ Life of Principal Rainy, P. Carnegie Simpson, D.D., II, 438.

XIV. The conditions under which reconstruction, or doctrinal and ceremonial changes short of reconstruction, can properly be brought about vary in different Churches. In Scotland the Barrier Act of 1697, in this country the Royal Supremacy, acts as a check upon hasty and ill-considered change. More decisive, however, than the positive restraints imposed by the wisdom of the legislator, either on the zeal of the reformer or the stubborn *non possumus* of the obstructive, is the mysterious instinct which guides the life of mankind in accordance with an ever-widening purpose to a distant but an assured goal. The society of the future, economists tell us, will differ widely from that of the present. The same may be said, and with equal certainty, of its religion. The simultaneous movement of thought in all the Churches, and its substantial identity under a variety of surroundings, are as calculated to excite the attention of the observer as were the signs which announced the shattering of the imposing fabric of European society which took place more than a century ago. And we may apply to the former the words used by Burke of the latter — the wisest perhaps that he ever wrote of the great event in question:

“If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate.”²⁰

²⁰ Thoughts on French Affairs.

ENGLISH OPINION OF LUTHER

PRESERVED SMITH

POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK

I. CONTEMPORARY

It is sometimes said that what matters in history is not so much the fact as what people think is the fact. This is perhaps especially true of those commanding personalities whose names are household words. Popular ideas of them are usually only roughly correct. The names become symbols to denote qualities dear to a succeeding age but often foreign to the persons they designate. To every generation Christ has become something different, this or that side of his character being emphasized to fill the ever changing need of living men. How many philosophies and passions have been read into Shakespeare's plays! So to every generation Luther has meant something different; in each succeeding century he has been both loved and hated, but for different reasons. No country save his own has given him such attention as England. It is the aim of the present paper to give a very broad idea of the general trend of British opinion throughout four hundred years.

Luther's appearance on the English horizon was as stormy as most of his career. The dawn of the Reformation "came up like thunder" across the North Sea. Within two years after the posting of the famous Theses we are told that Oxford and Cambridge had declared war on the Saxon. This was due to the infection of certain of their members with the new tenets. On March 8, 1521, William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury,

wrote to Wolsey that it was a pity that "a small number of incircumspect fools should endanger the whole university with the charge of Lutheranism." In the same year, if not earlier, Luther's works were burnt at Cambridge, after having been examined by Drs. Humfry, Watson, Bullock, and Ridley. Erasmus heard that the said works would have been publicly burnt by the government in May, 1520, had not he (Erasmus) interceded for them. This ceremony actually took place in the presence of the king and all the court at St. Paul's Churchyard, Sunday, May 12, 1521, on which occasion John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, delivered a sermon "reprobating the friar Martin and upholding the authority of the Pope." Two days later a mandate was issued by Wolsey forbidding the circulation of the heretic's works in England, an act repeated later at intervals. Cuthbert Tunstall, afterwards Bishop of London, while Ambassador at the Diet of Worms, wrote a very hostile estimate of Luther and his works, which he prayed God to keep out of England.

Before any of his subjects, Henry VIII publicly entered the lists against the heretic. His *Assertion of the Seven Sacraments*, published in 1521 as a refutation of *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, was declared by Pope Leo X the best medicine against the new errors that he had ever read, and it won for its author the title of Defender of the Faith. The argument does not concern us now. The writer's estimate of Luther is thus forcibly expressed:

"What pest so pernicious has ever attacked the flock of Christ? What serpent so poisonous has ever come forth? . . . What a wolf of hell is he, seeking to scatter Christ's flock! What a limb of Satan! How rotten is his mind! how execrable his purpose!"

Five years later Henry published another *Letter against Martin Luther*, in which he said to his subjects:

"For we doute not that it is well knowen to you all, that Martyn Luther, late a frere Augustyne, & now ron out i Apostacy & wedded, hath not only scraped out of the asshen and kyndeled agayne all the embres of those old errorrs & heresies hytherto; but hath also added some so poysoned pointes of his owne, so wretched, so vyle, so detestable, provokynge men to myschefe, encoragyng the worlde to syn, preachyng an unsaciate lyberte, to allecte them withall."

Most of those under the influence of the court followed the example of their sovereign in execrating the German. On St. Martin's Eve, November 10, 1527, the boys of St. Paul's school, under their master, Rightwise, gave a play at court glorifying Wolsey and representing "the heretic Luther like a party friar in russet damask and black taffety, and his wife like a frow of Almayn in red silk."¹

The greatest Englishman of his day, Sir Thomas More, also took a strong stand against Luther. According to the king it was More who "by subtle, sinister slights most unnaturally procured and provoked him to set forth a book of the assertion of the seven sacraments." More was sincerely repelled by most of Luther's doctrines, first of all by the *sola fide*.² Determinism was also repulsive to him, and he blamed the Wittenberg professor for saying, "God doth damn so huge a number of people to intolerable and interminable torments only for his own pleasure, and for his own deeds wrought in them only by himself."³ He also criticized the freedom of the German theologian's treatment of the Bible, saying, "Luther goeth so farforth that no scripture can be evident to prove anything that he list to deny. . . . And sometime if it be too plain against him, then will he call it no scripture, as he playeth with the pistle of

¹ C. W. Wallace, *Evolution of the English Drama to Shakespeare*, 1912, pp. 66-68. The conjecture of Brandl (*Quellen des weltlichen Dramas vor Shakespeare*, 1898, p. lvi) that the source of this play was Hasenburg's *Ludus ludentem Luderum ludens*, is very doubtful.

² More's *Workes*, 1557, p. 418 h.

³ *Ibid.* 273 c.

St. James.”⁴ Had More confined himself to these reasonable strictures he might have done a permanent service to the cause he had at heart. Unfortunately he fell into the foul-mouthed invective common at the time. “Luther is an apostate,” he wrote, “an open incestuous lecher, a plain limb of the devil, and a manifest messenger of hell.”⁵ He mocked at “Friar Luther and Cate Callate his nun lusing together in lechery.”⁶ He objected to the German’s scurrility in the following passage,⁷ in the translation of which I have been obliged to expurgate some words absolutely unprintable:

“Luther and counsellors disperse themselves throughout all the wagons, vehicles, and boats, the baths, eating-houses and barber-shops, the taverns, brothels, bakeshops, privies, and houses of ill fame; in these places they diligently observe and write down on tablets whatever the waggon driver has said basely, or the slave servilely, or the drunkard wickedly, or the parasite scurrilously, or the harlot petulantly, or the bawd vilely, or the bathman obscenely. . . . When they have done this for several months they stuff the whole nasty mixture of reviling, scolding, scurrility, jeers, petulance, filth, dirt, mud, mire, and dung into the fetid sewer of Luther’s breast.”

At other times he called Luther an ass, a liar, an evil angel of Satan, a cursed beast, and a drunkard. No wonder that even his friend Erasmus thought that More had written more bitterly than Luther himself. Not content with words, More had his own servants “striped like children,” when he found them inclining to the new doctrines.

A similar tone was taken by John Langland, Bishop of Lincoln, who in a sermon preached at Westminster, November 27, 1527, thus apostrophized the Saxon: “O Luther, Luther, worst of liars and lost deceiver of men,

⁴ More’s *Workes*, 1557, 161 c.

⁵ *Ibid.* 274 h.

⁶ *Ibid.* 423 h.

⁷ *Mori Opera*, 1689, p. 38.

minister equally unfaithful to God and to the Christian world, I know thy heresy!"

The Scotch poet David Lyndsay wrote in 1540:

"As I pray to the Rude
That Martin Luther, that fals loun,
Black Bullinger and Melancthoun,
Had bene smorde in their cude."

As Luther heard chiefly of the hostility to his "gospel" in Britain, it is not surprising that his opinion of the islanders was mostly unfavorable. "There are no wolves in England," he once said, "because the English are themselves wolves." Henry VIII he judged as "a damnable and rotten worm who with malice aforethought has blasphemed my King in heaven," and as "a devil incarnate." Wolsey he held to be "the pest of the kingdom." Lee, Wolsey's successor as Archbishop of York, he classed among "the snivelling, drivelling sophists bred by the Thomist swine." More he thought "a most cruel enemy of the gospel" and he rejoiced at his execution and at that of Fisher.

But it must not be imagined that Luther did not have strong partisans in England from the very first. Early in 1519 Froben exported many of Luther's writings to Britain. On May 30 of that year Erasmus wrote Luther, "In England there are men who think well of your writings, and they the very greatest." Precisely what persons Erasmus had in mind is uncertain, but quite probably he referred to John Colet, who early in 1518 had sent him the Ninety-five Theses. In 1520 we know that there were already Lutherans in London, and they continued to be a growing party until the ultimate triumph of Protestantism under Elizabeth. At an early date some students of Cambridge, among them Bilney, Arthur Ridley, Latimer, and Coverdale met at the White Horse Inn to form a Lutheran organization. They were

mocked at as "Germans" and their meeting place called "Germany." Several prominent Englishmen were among Luther's personal friends, among them Robert Barnes, an Augustinian and Oxford doctor of divinity, Edward Fox, Bishop of Hereford, Nicholas Heath, Archdeacon of Stratford, and Lord Paget. On some of the English Reformers Luther exercised a decisive influence, notably on Cranmer. Tyndale was apparently more of a Zwinglian, at least in his eucharistic doctrine. He got much help from Luther's German Bible, though he denied that in making his translation he had been "confederate with Luther," as More and others asserted. There is no evidence to show that he ever saw Luther.

Coverdale was even more dependent on the German Bible than was Tyndale, so that when the first complete edition came out in 1535 the title-page proclaimed that it was translated out of "the Douche and Latin." Coverdale explained this in his preface by saying that he had been helped by "the Douche interpreters: whom (because of theyr syngular gyftes and speciall diligence in the Bible) I haue ben the more glad to folowe for the most part." Coverdale also translated other works of Luther into English, among them some of his hymns, including *Ein' feste Burg*. Besides these there were seven of Luther's works turned into English before his death, five of which were popular enough to be printed more than once. In addition to this John Bale put into his own tongue, *The true Historie of the Christen Departyng of the Reverend Man D. Martyn Luther, collected by J. J[onas], M. C[elius] and J. A[urifaber] which were present thereat*. A manuscript copy of this in the British Museum is dated 1545, an apparent anachronism due to the old habit of beginning the year on March 25. Luther died February 18, 1546, and the version must therefore have been made at once. It was printed as soon as made.

II. THE AGE OF SHAKESPEARE

Save for the short reign of Mary, England became a Protestant nation after the death, within a year, of Luther and Henry VIII. From the same time, however, the influence of Calvin appears, and gradually overshadowed that of the German Reformer, until the triumph of the Puritans. In the reign of Edward VI there were three new translations of Luther's works into English, in the reign of Mary one, seventeen under Elizabeth, not counting five reprints, and one in the reign of James I. In 1550 or 1551 we learn from a letter of Hales to Gualter that the likenesses of Luther, Bucer, Melancthon, and Oecolampadius were to be found everywhere in London. The chief stumbling-block to the Protestants was the lack of unity among their leaders, especially the unfortunate schism on the doctrine of the real Presence. Thus John Hooper wrote to Bucer in 1548:

"I entreat you, my master, not to say or write anything against charity or godliness for the sake of Luther, or to burden the consciences of men with his words on the holy supper. Although I readily acknowledge with thankfulness the gifts of God in him who is now no more, yet he was not without his faults. . . . After the dispute with Zwingli and Oecolampadius respecting the supper had begun to grow warm he did violence to many passages of Scripture that he might establish the corporeal presence of Christ in the bread. . . . Everyone is aware with what calumnies and reproaches he attacked even the dead."

Another great scandal to the English Protestant divines was Luther's doctrine that polygamy and concubinage were at times permissible. More had blamed the statement in the *Babylonian Captivity* that bigamy was preferable to divorce,⁸ and a similar expression was fastened

⁸ Opera, 1689, p. 145.

on by Dr. Thomas Martin. In 1556 the Lutheran Ponet⁹

"vindicated Martin Luther against a common falsehood raised up of him, which Dr. Thomas Martin thrust into his book; namely that Luther had writ in his book *De Captivitate Babylonica*, Si uxor non possit aut non vult, ancilla venito; that is, If the wife cannot or will not, let the maid come. Whereupon our author (Ponet) accosts Martin: 'Speak again, Martin, where saith Luther these words? Thou sayest in his book *De Captivitate Babylonica*. The selfsame lie maketh Pighius. . . . I assure thee, good reader, it is a foul lie.'"

The words attributed to Luther actually occur in his *Sermon on Marriage*, of 1522.¹⁰

In 1559 Dr. Feckeham, abbot of Westminster, made an oration in Parliament, "with very unworthy, and unbecoming reflections upon the foreign Protestants of greatest eminence, as Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli, and Martyr, for their different sentiments about the sacrament."

A third great stone of offence to Luther's reputation was his doctrine of the bondage of the will. An early radical, Cole of Faversham, declared that the doctrine of predestination was meeter for devils than for Christian men. In 1562 Grindal, Bishop of London, thus expatiates upon it:

"It is astonishing to see that they are raising such commotion about predestination. They should at least consult their own Luther 'on the bondage of the will.' For what else do Bucer, Calvin, and Martyr teach that Luther has not maintained in that treatise? Unless perhaps they wish to take refuge in some recantation of Luther, whom they all regard as a god. Luther has indeed deserved exceeding well of the church, and is worthy of being celebrated by all posterity. But he would have been more eminent in my eyes, if these Canaans were not always discovering the nakedness of their father, which all godly persons desire to be concealed."

⁹ Strype's Memorials, 1822, vol. iii, part i, p. 531.

¹⁰ Werke, Weimar, vol. x, part ii, p. 290.

In 1568 Cheney, Bishop of Gloucester, said:

"Luther wrote a very ill book against *free-will*; wherein he did very much hurt. But Erasmus answered him learnedly. I am not of Luther's opinion therein, but of Erasmus' mind."

Some controversy on the subject was excited by a work of the Catholic Osorius (1563) who "reproved our later reformers, beginning with Luther, whose ghost he tore with evil speeches, reproaching him for a bold, for a popular, nay for a mad-man." Osorius asserted that Luther "wickedly taught extreme desperation, and a bold and presumptuous confidence in salvation." John Foxe, the martyrologist, branded these statements as "two notorious lies." Haddon replied to Osorius:

"That man of God whom you thus miscall, rendered a sound and sober account of his faith in an august assembly before the Emperor Charles; that mad-man stood safe against the wisest patrons of your Church thirty years, however they raged against him."

A very high opinion of Luther was expressed by another Elizabethan divine, Bishop John Aylmer, who said that Luther was able

"to set up the cross of Christ, to pull down the chair of Antichrist, to restore God's Word, to banish the Devil's sophistry, to make of darkness light, of lies truth, of plain foolishness true wisdom, and, as it were another Helena, to find out the cross of Christ hidden in the dunghill of devilish doctrine, covered with the rotten bones of Romish martyrs, sinful saints, and counterfeit confessors."

Further evidence of the trend of public opinion is given now and then indirectly. Just as Knox praises Geneva as the most perfect school of Christ since the Apostles, so Roger Ascham proclaims Protestant Germany as the abode of all the virtues. Then again the name of Martin Marprelate, assumed by the author of some famous tracts, was undoubtedly suggested by Luther's prenomens.

John Foxe in part iv of his *Acts and Monuments* (1563) has much on Luther, with lists of his works and some translations. He presents him as the man of God raised up to do a particular and necessary work in the church. For about three centuries this book held a high place in popular estimation and influenced the current ideas of the Reformation more than any other, but of late the author has been violently attacked for his strong bias and rather frequent inaccuracy. There is no doubt that he wrote rather for the edification of the pious than for the impartial presentation of the facts.

A high estimate of Luther is witnessed by some of the folk literature of the time. William Bullein in *A dialogue both pleasaunt and pietifull, wherein is a godlie regiment against the Fever Pestilence*, speaks of a painting by William Boswell, exhibited in Paternoster Row, showing the following pairs: "Christ and Satan, Sainct Peter and Simon Magus, Paule and Alexander the Coppersmith, Trace and Becket, Martin Luther and the Pope." The same antithesis is seen in a contemporary *Ballad of Luther, the Pope, a Cardinal, and a Husbandman*. In this there are reminiscences of *Ein' feste Burg*. Luther addresses the Pope thus:

"Thy false power wyl I bryng down,
Thou shalt not reign many a yere,
I shall dryve the from citey and towne,
Even with this PEN that thou seyste here:
Thou fyghtest with swerd, shyld, and speare,
But I wyll fyght with Gods worde."

The references to Luther by the Elizabethan poets are few and far between. There is no mention of him by Spenser, though some scholars have seen veiled allusions to him in the First Book of the *Faerie Queene*.¹¹ It is thought that the Red Cross Knight represents Henry

¹¹ F. M. Padelford, *The Political and Ecclesiastical Allegory of the First Book of the Faerie Queene*. 1911.

VIII, Una the true Church of England, and the "deceiving image," which takes Una's form to mislead the knight, Lutheranism. But the whole theory is doubtful, most of all in the last identification.

Save for one phrase about "the spleeny Lutherans" in *Henry VIII* there is no reference by Shakespeare to either the German Reformer or his followers. As far as I can discover, contemporary dramatists showed an equal lack of interest in the subject. Thomas Nash in his *Unfortunate Traveller* (1594) describes an imaginary

"solempne disputation where Luther and Carolostadius scolded leuell coile. A masse of words I wot well they heapt up against the masse and the Pope, but farther perticulars of their disputations I remember not. I thought verily they would have worried one another with wordes, they were so earnest and vehement."

In the same class with the above may be mentioned Fynes Morrison's *Itinerary*¹² and John Taylor's *Travels in Germany* (both 1617). Both show interest in Luther. If Nash is not afraid to poke fun at the Reformer, a much bitterer satire on him appeared in 1609 under the title *Pruritanus [sic] . . . sive Apologia pro Puritanis & novatoribus universis*. The author gives his name as Horatius Dolabellus Neapolitanus, and the place of publication as Lutetiae Britannarum, both obviously invented.

Francis Bacon has left one guarded account of Luther in his *Advancement of Learning*, Book I:

"There are . . . three distempers of learning. . . . The first disease, which consists in luxuriancy of style, has been anciently esteemed at different times, but strangely prevailed about the time of Luther, who, finding how great a task he had undertaken against the degenerate traditions of the Church, and being unassisted by the opinions of his own age, was forced to awake antiquity to make a party for him; whence the ancient authors both in divinity and the humanities, that had long slept in libraries, began to be generally read."

¹² Morrison visited Wittenberg in 1591. He says he saw the house of "Dr. Faustus the famous conjurer" there. The same connection of Faust and Wittenberg is made in Marlowe's play.

III. THE PURITANS

The Puritan feeling for Luther was rather a cool one, not professedly hostile but decidedly critical. There were two reasons for this. On the Continent the mutual hatred of the Calvinists and the Lutherans was almost as great as their common detestation of the Catholics. The point that divided the Protestant churches was the doctrine of the sacrament, Lutherans holding to the corporeal Presence more literally than did Calvinists. These disputes were also rife in England, though in a milder form. Then again the German had too little respect for the proprieties and austerities so dear to the Puritan heart. He had expressed approval of amusements like cards and dancing, anathema to the Independents.

During the whole of the seventeenth century there were only six new translations of Luther's works and ten reprints as against seventeen new translations and five reprints during the reign of Elizabeth. The history of one of these new versions, *Dr. Martin Luther's Colloquia Mensalia, or his last Divine Discourses at his Table, translated out of the High Dutch by Captain Henry Bell, 1652*, illustrates both of the points just mentioned. In the first place, in order to make his work acceptable to the English palate Bell thought it worth while to assert, contrary to all truth, that in these "last divine discourses" Luther had revoked the "error he once held touching the sacrament." Then when Bell petitioned the Commons for license to print, an assembly of divines was appointed to examine the work, and reported, May 3, 1647,¹³ that although the book contained many good things, most of them extant in the Reformer's own works, yet it also abounded in passages contrary to modesty, gravity, and truth, making it unfit for public use.

¹³ Historical Manuscripts Report, vi, 173.

A similar cool, critical position is taken by Sir Thomas Brown, who, in his *Religio Medici* (1642) says that he holds the faith of the Church of England, and that

“whatsoever is beyond, as points indifferent, I observe according to the rules of my private judgement or the humor and fashion of my devotion, neither following this because Luther affirmed it, nor disproving that because Calvin hath disavouched it.”

Though Oliver Cromwell has left no estimate of Luther, there were in his camp a small party of extremists who appealed to the authority of the German to justify their antinomian and anti-social tenets. Such was William Dell, a field-chaplain at Cromwell's headquarters, a preacher in a radical form of justification by faith only. Dell also abused Luther's authority to support an attack on human learning. In his *Tryal of Spirits* (1660) he printed under the title, *Testimony of Martin Luther touching Universities*, a part of the Reformer's *Answer to Ambrose Catharinus*. Dell prefaces it thus: “These now are Luther's own words, which I have made legible to English men. Wherein it is manifest that he condemns Universities in the very Institution and Constitution of them.” Of Dell's party was John Eaton, the author of *The honey-combe of free justification by Christ alone* (1642). In this essay it would seem that he both built upon the Wittenberg theologian and went beyond him.

John Milton confesses that he “had not examined through” Luther's works, and was certainly not deeply indebted to him. Coleridge states that Milton got the idea that Eve ate the apple at noon from the *Table Talk* translated by Bell. It is possible that the poet may have been thinking of the Reformer in his description of Noah in *Paradise Lost*:

“The only son of light
In a dark age, against example good,
Against allurement, custom, and a world
Offended. Fearless of reproach and scorn
Or violence.”

But this is merely a conjecture. That he thought well of Luther, as far as he thought of him at all, is seen in an obiter dictum in the *Apology for Smectimnuus*, where the poet is excusing the violence of his language. After appealing to the example of the Bible he goes on:

“Yet that ye may not think inspiration the only warrant thereof, but that it is as any other virtue, of moral and general observation, the example of Luther may stand for all . . . who writ so vehemently against the chief defenders of the old untruths in the Roman Church, that his own friends and favorers were offended with the fierceness of his spirit. . . . And herewithal how useful and available God made this tart rhetoric in the Church’s cause, he often found by his own experience.”

Of Luther’s *Commentary on Galatians*, one of the first of his works to be put into English and one of the most frequently reprinted, the following high estimate is given by John Bunyan:

“When I had but a little way perused, I found my condition in his experience so largely and profoundly handled as if his book had been written out of my own heart. . . . I do prefer this book of Martin Luther upon the Galatians (except the Holy Bible) before all the books that ever I have seen, as most fit for a wounded conscience.”

The other chief religious writers of the age have little or nothing to say of Luther. Neither in George Fox on the one hand nor in Chillingworth and Baxter on the other, have I found one word about him. Jeremy Taylor barely mentions him, in his *Power falsely pretended to by the Church of Rome*, as the opponent of the Pope. Bishop Burnet, however, had much to say of him in the famous *History of the Reformation* (1679), and all of a highly laudatory character. Burnet’s partisanship went so far that he even suppressed facts discreditable to the Reformer of which he was certainly in possession.

The poets and wits of the Restoration naturally had no use for Luther, and, as far as my rather limited knowledge of their work goes, never mentioned him.

IV. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

At no time has the name of Luther meant less to England than during the age of Voltaire. The rationalism, sophistication, and worldliness characteristic of the period resulted in a deadly indifference to a man of so opposite a spirit. During the whole century there was but one new translation from Luther. John Wesley represented the reaction always found among a minority against the prevalent spirit, and it is from him that the strongest testimony to Luther's influence comes. As is well known, he ascribed his "conversion" (although he was at the time, 1738, already a clergyman) to hearing read a passage from Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans, "describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ."

Another mark of interest is shown by the publication in 1709 of Strype's voluminous *Annals of the Reformation*. Though concerned mainly with the printing of English sources, there is a good deal about Luther in this and the tone is decidedly favorable.

Jonathan Swift's *Tale of a Tub* satirizes impartially the churches of Rome, Wittenberg, and Geneva, under the names of the brothers "Peter, Martin, and Jack." On the whole Martin's course is approved more than that of either of the others, the one being thought too conservative, the other too radical.

Though one may look in vain for any allusion to Luther in the writings of Johnson or Goldsmith or Pope or Addison, we find in the secular historians some estimate of the man. Robertson's famous *Charles V* (1769) was the most impartial account of the Reformation yet

written. A sincere and on the whole successful endeavor is made to depict both Luther's virtues and his faults. A particularly labored apology for his violence of language shows how alien were both his enthusiasm and his grossness to the spirit of the time. A far greater historian, Gibbon, has left, in his monumental work, two references to Luther expressing pretty nearly the same general attitude as that taken by Robertson. He ascribes the horrors of the sack of Rome in 1527 to the fact that the troops

"had imbibed, in the first fervor of the Reformation, the spirit as well as the principles of Luther. It was their favorite amusement to insult or destroy the consecrated objects of Catholic superstition; they indulged, without pity or remorse, a devoted hatred against the clergy."

In a more elaborate passage Gibbon weighs the merit and value of the Reformation. He notes that if we ask from what articles of faith above or against our reason the Reformers enfranchised Christians, "we shall rather be surprised by the timidity than scandalized by the freedom of" these men. They adopted from Catholicism all the creeds, mysteries, and miracles, and Luther even maintained a corporeal and Calvin a real Presence of Christ in the eucharist. "Yet," adds Gibbon, "the services of Luther and his rivals are solid and important; and the philosopher must own his obligations to these fearless enthusiasts." In the first place, they levelled with the ground the lofty fabric of superstition, consisting of the worship of saints and of relics, and substituted for it a simpler and purer worship. They also restored myriads of monks and nuns to liberty and labor. Finally they broke the chain of authority, though this act was "a consequence rather than a design" of the Reformation.

V. THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

The violent reaction from eighteenth century modes of thought, called Romanticism, showed itself also in the changed opinion regarding Luther. At no time has the Reformer been so warmly praised in England as during the first half of the nineteenth century. In certain quarters this high estimate has continued, but the prevailing tone of thought has since changed.

The highest encomiums of Luther were uttered by Coleridge and Carlyle. Coleridge could not imagine a more charming book than one containing Luther's letters, especially those written from the Wartburg. "The only fit commentator for Paul was Luther," he thought—"not by any means such a gentleman as the Apostle but almost as great a genius." The English philosopher himself wrote a commentary on the *Table Talk* in Bell's translation. Much of it is rather too metaphysical, discussing points which the original author would not have understood, and sometimes expressing opinions with which, I am sure, he would not have been in agreement. In general the commentator warmly endorses all that is said in the text. When the Wittenberg professor pontificates that the best proof that the world has been created by God is that Moses wrote everything down just as it happened, the Englishman adds a hearty "Hear! Hear!" or words to that effect. When Luther says that it is better to have the temple broken than to have Christ hidden therein, Coleridge simply and truly remarks, "Sublime!"

Carlyle came prepared to "worship" Luther as one of the "heroes" of history. To him the Reformer was one of the strong men who have been rightly kings, "the bravest heart then living in the world . . . if also one of the humblest and peaceablest." Luther's books, he

says, are not well written, though their dialect became the language of all Germany:

"But in no Books have I found a more robust, genuine, I will say noble faculty of a man than in these. A rugged honesty, homeliness, simplicity; a rugged sterling sense and strength. He flashes out illumination from him; his smiting idiomatic phrases seem to cleave into the very secret of the matter. Good humor too, nay tender affection, nobleness, and depth; this man could have been a Poet too! He had to *work* an Epic Poem, not write one. I call him a great Thinker; as indeed his greatness of heart already betokens that."

It is perhaps worth while remarking that Carlyle's hero was not the historic one, but at least in part legendary. At that time (1840), without more special study than Carlyle cared to put on the subject, it was not possible to get at the real Luther. There were two legends current, the Catholic and the Protestant, and of them the latter was nearer the truth. I do not mean to imply that the Scotch writer's admiration was wholly based on a false estimate, for his portrait of Luther is quite recognizable, nevertheless it is no less unmistakably idealized.

There are many proofs that the popular opinion of the Reformer was as high as that of the leading thinkers. During the nineteenth century there were forty-three new translations of his works and fourteen reprints, as against one new version and three reprints in the preceding century. Some of these books included several separate works of the Reformer; a few of them came from America.

Many distinguished writers have left brief but exalted estimates of Luther. De Quincey speaks of him as "the heroic reformer." Wordsworth, in one of the *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*, writes of the early English Protestants, banished for their faith, as "most happy reassembled in a land by dauntless Luther freed." Robert Browning, in *The Twins*, versifies a story from the *Table Talk*, commencing it:

“Grand rough old Martin Luther
Bloomed fables—flowers on furze,
The better the uncouth:
Do roses stick like burrs?”

Some very favorable opinions may be found among the greater historians of this “romantic” age. The highest possible tribute to the Reformer is paid by J. A. Froude, himself a rationalist. He calls the appearance before the Diet of Worms the most notable spectacle witnessed on the planet since Christ stood before Pilate. The German translation of the Bible, says Froude, “is as rich and grand as our own,” and the table talk as full of matter as Shakespeare’s plays. Luther was found to be the incarnation of conscience, and withal sociable, cheerful, without a trace of vanity or self-interest.

J. A. Symonds (in his *Catholic Reaction*, 1882) writes:

“Luther was stronger in his weakness than the creator of the Jesuit machinery, wiser in his simplicity than the deviser of that subtle engine. But Luther had the onward forces of humanity on his side—Ignatius could but retard them by his ingenuity.”

VI. OUR OWN TIMES

No less than four separate causes have undermined the position of Luther in England during the last two generations. As these causes have affected America much less, it is only in our own age that one sees a marked national divergence between the mother country and her daughter in this regard. While Luther is held in high honor in America as a whole, and perhaps also in Scotland, the prevailing tone in England, though with a minority opposition, is one of bitter hostility, expressed now in a sneer and again in a tirade.

The first and strongest of these causes was the Catholic movement in the Church of England. J. A. Froude said in 1867 with perfect truth:

"Two generations ago the leading Reformers were looked upon as little less than saints; now a party has risen up who intend, as they frankly tell us, to unprotestantize the Church of England, who detest Protestantism as a kind of infidelity, who desire simply to reverse everything which the Reformers did. One of these gentlemen, a clergyman, writing lately of Luther, called him a heretic, a heretic fit only to be ranked with—whom do you think?—Joe Smith, the Mormon Prophet. . . . The book in which this remarkable statement appeared was presented by two bishops to the Upper House of Convocation. It was received with gracious acknowledgments by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and was placed solemnly in the library of reference, for that learned body to consult. So too a professor at Oxford the other day spoke of Luther as a Philistine—a Philistine meaning an oppressor of the chosen people; the enemy of men of culture and intelligence, such as the professor himself."

The neo-Catholic movement had got well under way by the time Froude wrote. Its leader, John Henry Newman, before he joined the Church of Rome, attacked the Reformers in his *Lectures on Justification* (1838). "It is aimed," said he, "at the Lutheran dictum that justification by faith only was the cardinal doctrine of Christianity. I considered that this doctrine was either a paradox or a truism—a paradox in Luther's mouth, a truism in Melancthon's. I thought the Anglican Church followed Melancthon." But Newman was not yet ready to break with the Reformation entirely. Five years previously he had written: "No great work was done by a system; whereas systems rise out of individual exertions. Luther was an individual. The very faults of an individual excite attention; he loses, but his cause (if good and he powerful-minded) gains." But naturally even such qualified approval of the first Protestant had to go when the author became a Roman Catholic. In his *Apologia* (1865) he wrote: "The spirit of Luther is dead; but Hildebrand and Loyola are alive." Even now, however, he was capable of quoting the German to buttress his own defence against Kingsley. Arguing

that equivocation was worse than lying, he quoted the famous "pecca fortiter" of Luther with the comment, "I anathematize his formal sentiment, but there is a truth in it when spoken of material acts." Elsewhere he attempts to prove that Lutheranism is a private, arbitrary, unscriptural system of unreal righteousness and real corruption, a system of words without ideas, and that Lutheran faith could not exist and could not justify if it did exist.

Newman's circle was no whit behind him in reviling the Reformers. Hurrell Froude confessed that he could not express the amount of his hatred for them. To Father Brigett, the biographer of Sir Thomas More, Luther was nothing but "a foul-mouthed German boor." Were it worth while, an anthology of very derogatory Catholic opinion might be cited from contemporary England. Following the lead of Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical of December 28, 1878, it has been the fashion to blame the Reformation for such evils as are, in the Catholics' opinion, modern socialism and anarchism. Hilaire Belloc has written to this effect (1912).

The temper of the universities may be gauged by the honorary doctorate in divinity and its accompanying encomium given to Father Denifle for writing his *Luther und Lutherthum*, rightly described by the English historian Gooch as "eight hundred pages hurled at the memory of the Reformer, and among the most repulsive books in historical literature."

Opinion among Anglican Catholics has varied from supercilious attenuation to a virulence unsurpassed by their Roman brethren. One of the most noted of them is Sir William Hamilton, for in this respect his view was determined entirely by his religious, not by his philosophical, prepossessions. In a work *Be not Schismatics* he depreciated Luther. He was answered by Archdeacon J. C. Hare, and returned to the subject in his *Discussions*

of *Philosophy and Literature* (1853). The tone of his invective may be gathered from his calling Bucer the *âme damnée* of the Reformation, punning on his name as "puss," a feline nature, and by his characterization of the Hessian Reformer Melsingen as "a syphilitic saint and trigamist." Luther he thinks will be most finally condemned by simple quotation from his works. It is interesting to see what he selects. He groups all his charges under three heads. 1. Luther's determinism, including his doctrine that God damns and saves irrespective of merit. 2. Luther's opinion that polygamy is lawful. 3. His Biblical criticism. It seems as if Hamilton really thought that it was the climax of the Reformer's baseness that he said the Book of Kings was more worthy of credit than Chronicles, that Solomon's Proverbs had been gathered by others, that Hebrews was not by Paul, that Job was a fable, and that Esther and James should be excluded from the canon. In our day it is hardly needful to remark how much more in the line of modern science and philosophy were the observations of the Wittenberg professor than were the dogmas of the Scotch metaphysician. Indeed, the self-contradiction of those who alternately blame Luther for bibliolatry and then find supreme offence in his rational treatment of Scripture, has only been brought out in the latest age. An anonymous writer in the *Athenaeum* (1911) takes exactly this position, remarking, *à propos* of Luther's objections to James, "that he rules himself out of court as a theologian by endeavoring to concoct a system of divinity while neglecting one of the documents."

One of the favorite methods of depreciating Luther has been to exalt one of his contemporaries, usually Colet, More, or Erasmus, at his expense. This is done in a very mild way, without vituperation, by Lupton in his various works on Colet, by W. H. Hutton in his life of More, by Seebohm in his *Oxford Reformers*.

Another line of attack is found by the Anglicans, as by the Roman Catholics, in attributing various modern tendencies, alleged to be bad, to the Reformation. Dr. J. Neville Figgis, of the Society of the Resurrection, has cultivated this field with diligence. He brackets Luther and Machiavelli as the two chief sources of modern absolutism and the immoral "reason of state." How completely he wishes to identify himself with the Catholic view of Luther may also be seen in his review of the life of Luther by the Jesuit H. Grisar, a ponderous work now being Englished for the edification of the faithful.

Nevertheless, there has been even among the highest dignitaries of the Anglican Church a certain section disposed to find a support for conservative doctrine in Luther's authority. Thus Frederick Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, in his *Charge to his Clergy* (1898) stated that the Anglican theory of the real Presence was hard to distinguish from Luther's doctrine. This opinion, Dean Hensley Henson informs us, was received by the (Anglican) Catholics "in disgust at the suggestion that they stand in the Eucharistic doctrine with the protagonist of Protestantism."

A temperate, and on the whole very fair estimate of Luther is given by Bishop Mandell Creighton in his well-known *History of the Papacy*. His wife, in her life of him, says: "With the central figure of his drama, Luther himself, the Bishop was not much in sympathy. He was to him an astounding phenomenon, an extraordinary force, without whom the Reformation would have been impossible, but Erasmus was far more congenial to him." Writing to Kolde in 1894 Creighton said that Luther's personality was the hardest to understand in the whole period; that he was neither a theologian nor a statesman, but a popular leader, with the capacity of picking up what was in the air and expressing it forcibly.

But there is another group of critics of the Reformer and his work who are under no confessional bias at all. It is a remarkable fact that from the days of Erasmus till now there have been "intellectuals" to whom the principles as well as the methods of the Reformation have been repulsive. The best representative of these in the nineteenth century is Henry Hallam, who devotes considerable space to Luther in his *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the XV, XVI, and XVII Centuries* (1837). Although he professes to "regard Luther as a great man, endowed with many virtues, and an instrument of Providence for signal good," one would hardly suspect as much from the constant tone of his other references. He says that he will "neither dissemble nor slightly censure the enormous paradoxes which deform Luther's writings"; that the tendency of his doctrine was antinomian and disparaging to virtue; that his "grossness was scandalous," and that he "disgraces himself with nasty and stupid brutality." Moreover he thinks that Luther's intellectual gifts have been much exaggerated, that his works are marked by "intemperance, coarseness, inelegance, scurrility, wild paradoxes that menace the foundations of religious morality," these qualities not being compensated "by much strength and acuteness, still less by impressive eloquence." In short most of them are "bellowing in bad Latin," and show a "total absence of self-restraint."

Matthew Arnold thought it worth while to publish, under the title *St. Paul and Protestantism* (1883) an elaborate attack on the doctrine of justification by faith only and its author. "Solifidianism," says he, "is an erroneous human development." "What gives a religious teacher his permanent worth and vitality is," says Arnold, "after all, just the scientific value of his teaching, its correspondence with important facts, and the light it throws on them." As he distinctly implies that Luther's

teaching did not have this value, we conclude that in Arnold's estimate he had little worth and vitality.

With the advent of Darwinism it became inevitable that the Reformation should be judged by its relation to progress. The character of the Reformer is no longer the decisive criterion among the more thoughtful historians, nor is even the rationality of his tenets, considered from the philosophical standpoint, as had been the case with Voltaire and Gibbon. By a large school he is now weighed in the balance against what he might reasonably have been supposed to contribute to the causes of science, democracy, social reform, popular enlightenment, and secularization. In answering these questions it is remarkable that men under no confessional bias should divide on Luther almost as sharply as Catholics and Protestants. On the whole the verdict among these new judges has been unfavorable to Luther. W. E. H. Lecky, in his brilliant *History of Rationalism* (1865) mercilessly exposes Luther's credulity, superstition, intolerance, narrowness, and his persecuting and despotic spirit. A similar work has been done in America by Andrew D. White's *Warfare of Science and Religion*. C. Beard, in his well-known Hibbert Lectures on the relations of the Reformation to modern thought, took a favorable view of Luther's character but a rather doubtful one about the value of his work. He evidently preferred the method of Erasmus. Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, finds that the first serious breach in the mediæval theory of absolute authority was made by Luther's assertion of the right of private judgment on the fallibility of General Councils.¹⁴

A part of the growing coldness towards Luther is due as much to dislike of his methods as to disapproval of the results of his work. Thus Mark Pattison in his biography of Erasmus contributed to the ninth edition of the

¹⁴ *Why Men Fight*, 1917, p. 26.

Encyclopædia Britannica (and allowed to stand with revisions in the eleventh edition) speaks of Erasmus's quiet rationalism as doing more for progress than "all the rage and uproar of Luther's pamphlets."

Carrying this modern criticism of the Reformation in its relation to progress to an extreme, there has now arisen a school convinced that Luther was really a conservative, and his movement reactionary. Nietzsche is the great exponent of this view in Germany, though his position has been adopted more or less by scholars like Troeltsch. In America this line of criticism, the one which would naturally appeal to the progressive proclivities of our countrymen, has been carried much further than in England, and, in my judgment, to a length that can only be described as paradoxical. It is beyond the scope of this article to notice American opinion, and I shall therefore confine myself to English. Mr. P. S. Allen finds him "a religious leader contemning the things of this world and ensuing human advancement and even truth with aid from realms in which reason is not always allowed to have its perfect work" (1913). A. W. Benn in his *English Rationalism* (1906) says that it is a great mistake to describe Protestantism as a revolt of reason from superstition, though the fact that it has been so described is highly suggestive. J. B. Bury takes the same position, perhaps more unfavorably to the Reformers. Many similar judgments could be quoted. Fundamentally the same idea is set forth by Havelock Ellis in his *Impressions and Comments* (1915), as follows:

"Look, again, at Luther. There was the Catholic Church dying by inches, gently, even exquisitely. And here came that gigantic peasant with his too exuberant energy, battered the dying Church into acute sensibility, kicked it into emotion, galvanized it into life, prolonged its existence for a thousand years. The man who sought to exterminate the Church proved to be the greatest benefactor the Church had ever known."

As in international relations fear and hatred seem to play a more important part than good will, so it often appears that a man's intellectual alliances are determined fully as much by his dislike of one thing or party as by his love for another. Thus among the intellectuals we find a number of men rallying to Luther's support, though they have no special bond with him, because they hate so much the system which he combated. Thus the tribute paid to Luther by J. A. Symonds was apparently due to his loathing for the Jesuits.

It is difficult to class Bernard Shaw, because one of his dominant ideas is to prove that he is other than you think. He has discovered that praise from an enemy may be more irritating than any invective, and he has thus taken under his wing Jesus "as a first-rate political economist" and Luther as "a legitimate predecessor of Voltaire." Both of the latter gentlemen, he observes, were Tartars for the Catholic Church. Religion is to Shaw "a quaint but intelligible evolution from crude attempts to propitiate the destructive forces of Nature among savages." Among these propitiatory attempts were the austerities of mediæval saints. "But Luther delivered us from all that. His reformation was a triumph of imagination and a triumph of cheapness. It brought you complete salvation and asked from you nothing but faith."

The third of the forces in modern England working against Luther is socialism. The strongest attack made on Luther, and one of the utmost violence, because he had no sympathy with political or social reform, is that by Belfort Bax in his three works on *Social Germany*, the *Peasants' War*, and the *Anabaptists*. To him the "true inwardness" of the Reformation lies in its change from a coöperative to an individualistic society, and its main-springs are economic. He thinks it worth while to attack Luther's character and doctrines as well as his

political ideas. Thus he says he was no Protestant in the English Puritan sense, and would not have been acceptable to the British Nonconformist conscience as representative in Parliament or even as a grocer-deacon. His views of marriage, says Bax, were very low. He accuses Luther of first supporting and then deserting the revolt of the knights under Sickingen, and of first egging on the peasants and then turning savagely against them. In the last charge there is much truth; in the others none. Bax's chief source is Janssen, and his animosity towards Luther extends to the latter's biographer, Principal T. M. Lindsay.

Even in this day it is so true that the interest in the Reformation is mainly theological that very little can be quoted on Luther from the socialist camp. Many writers, however, like those in the *Cambridge Modern History*, have been offended by his cruelty to the peasants. It is interesting to quote one high, if indiscriminating, tribute to Luther from John Helston, a poet who claims to be a socialist and sceptic. In a poem entitled, *To Germany in her Progress towards Socialism* (1913), he writes:

"The tyranny of later Rome began,
Till was humbled there a continent about the feet of Lies;
But Germany was waiting with a man,
And the voice of Luther thundered; and although they sought
to burn,
Poison, torture, maim, and murder as they might,
Mostly in the south they did it; northward men began to turn
To the first far beams of morning from the night."

The last of the four main currents making against Luther in contemporary England is hostility to Germany. As this is not confessedly allowed to color religious and historical judgments it is difficult to adduce texts in support of this assertion, but it can certainly be felt as an influence underlying and contributing to many of the

other judgments expressed and quoted above. Perhaps the sneers of Chesterton at "our German Luther" are as much animated by national as by confessional antipathy. Occasionally when something disparaging is said of Luther one will hear some such remark as "How German he was!" Sometimes, however, in the present war, Luther is appealed to against his countrymen. Thus *Punch* of April 19, 1916, has a full-page cartoon, alluding to the alleged horrors of the Wittenberg prisoners' camp, representing Luther saying to Shakespeare: "I see my countrymen claim you as one of them. You may thank God you're not that. They have made my Wittenberg—ay, and all Germany—to stink in my nostrils." Luther's words on war—"that it was as necessary as eating and drinking and any other business"—have been much quoted against him. No one, as far as I am aware, has called attention to the fact that his entire position in regard to war and whether soldiers can be in a state of grace, is taken bodily from the Canon Law (*Decreti pars ii*, capp. 3-7, c. 3).

These combined forces, operating in distinct and often in mutually antagonistic fields, have depressed Luther's reputation almost to its nadir in the England of today. He is neglected, hardly read or studied at all. Reviewers of books on Luther express their frank opinion that he is a man no longer worth writing about. In the twentieth century not one translation from Luther has been made by an Englishman. Two Scotch women have added to the list of his English works, one a selection from his sermons, one a selection from his letters. During the same time two very elaborate translations of his works have been undertaken in America, both series promising to extend to a number of volumes. A version of his correspondence has also been recently started in America, and a fresh translation of the *Table Talk*. From America too one could quote a much larger

number of good words about Luther and a much greater enthusiasm for him. This has been noticed by English writers, who attribute it to the backwardness of our intellectual culture. The only British scholar who has written extensively and sympathetically of Luther in the present century is a Scotchman, the late Principal T. M. Lindsay. To him the Reformer appears as a great religious genius, the central figure of his age, and the not faultless but on the whole very wonderful pattern of personal piety.

And yet testimonies to the Saxon are not wholly wanting even among contemporary Englishmen. I shall close with a few of them. Walter Pater (in his *Duke Carl of Rosenmold*) speaks of "the cheerful genius of Dr. Martin Luther, with his good times and his ringing laughter which sent dull goblins flitting." Next in this miscellaneous collection may be quoted a few words from Israel Zangwill's play *The Next Religion* (1912). The hero, Stephen, forced by conscience to give up the tenets of the Anglican Church in which he is a priest, exclaims, "Just as Luther was called to make the religion you now hold, so am I called to make the religion of our children." This is not cited as a personal tribute from Mr. Zangwill, but as evidence of his belief that some portion at least of English opinion still regards Luther as the prophet of their faith. Indeed, not altogether rarely one finds something that proves that this is so. One of the finest appreciations is by the Rev. E. S. Buchanan, of Oxford, a well-known scholar, who says (*Expositor*, 1915):

"I may say that spiritually I owe more to Martin Luther than to any of my own countrymen, and am under a greater debt to him for his bravery, for his courage, for his truth, for his humanity, for his total absence of all hypocrisy. If you ask me what was the grand thing about Martin Luther, it was that the man had not a line, not a trace of hypocrisy in his whole composition. I think this can scarcely be said truly of any other great ecclesiastic."

THE GENESIS OF ST. AUGUSTINE'S IDEA OF ORIGINAL SIN

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The thought of Augustine on the two ethical categories of sin and grace is of great importance in the history of Christian theology.¹ His system of grace and predestination prevailed for many centuries, although not without strong opposition, and underwent, through scholastic elaboration, substantial changes in order to save the freedom of the will; and finally it reappeared in the conception of the spiritual life shaped by Luther and the other teachers of the Reformation. It is on account of his doctrine about grace and predestination that Protestant theologians like to call Augustine "der Paulus nach Paulus und der Luther vor Luther."² Whatever may be the exactness of this genealogy, it shows at least the value and efficacy of the Augustinian conception of the natural and supernatural life on the development of the European spirit. In the Catholic tradition this thought of Augustine is at the very basis of the ethical, ecclesiological, and sacramental systems; in the Christian but non-Catholic movements this doctrine, interpreted in a rather paradoxical way, gave a starting-point to the Reformation.

¹ The success of the Augustinian doctrine was amazing. The author was still living when Prosper of Aquitania in his letter to Rufinus said: "Non solum Romana Africanaque ecclesia, sed per omnes mundi partes universi promissionis filii cum doctrina huius viri congruunt."

² Vide E. Troeltsch: *Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter*. München, 1915, 1.

No wonder therefore that in the history of Christian dogma no other doctrine has been so largely and deeply explored and discussed as has the Augustinian doctrine of sin and of restoration. And yet it is my conviction that in this analysis there is some gap, if not some mistake. The point in which the work of the scholars on this subject is defective, is that of the relation of the Augustinian thought to the Christian writers who preceded him. Some unexpected coincidences, some passages of the *Retractationes* insufficiently explained and others completely misunderstood to this day, led me on a path which seems to be the safest in order to trace back the origin of the Augustinian thought of original sin, which, it seems to me, is the primitive nucleus of the whole Augustinian system of sin and restoration.

A. Harnack, misled, if I am not mistaken, by Förster's book on Saint Ambrose,³ wrote that while the Augustinian theories on sacraments, faith, and the Church show some connection with Ambrosiaster and with Optatus Milevitanus, yet his ideas about sin and grace were inspired by his baptizer, Ambrose⁴ himself. It is not my intention to discuss here the truth of the first assumption, which I believe is partially wrong; but I affirm that the second one is entirely without basis. I cannot see how Ambrose, the author of the allegoric biblical commentaries, can be the spiritual father of the *De Genesi ad Literam*, neither can I recognize any dependence of the characteristic Augustinian opinions in regard to original sin and its psychologic consequences, which are so impregnated with a crude materialism, upon the very loose assumptions of Ambrose about our responsible

³ Förster: Ambrosius, Bischof von Mailand. Eine Darstellung seines Lebens und Wirkens. Halle, 1884.

⁴ "Haben Ambrosiaster und Optatus die Lehren Augustins über die Sakramente, den Glauben, und die Kirche vorbereitet, so Ambrosius die über die Sünde und die Gnade." Dogmengeschichte, III³, 44 (Tübingen, 1897).

participation in the sin of Adam.⁵ I think that it is exactly in his theories of original sin that Augustine depends closely and in a decisive way upon Ambrosiaster, from whom he derived,

(1) The formula in which he embodies the notion of our responsibility in the sin of Adam.

(2) The interpretation of the most discussed Pauline passages, especially Rom. 5 12.

(3) The fundamental notion of man "servus culpae servus gratiae."

(4) The general method of positive and realistic Scriptural interpretation, which is peculiar to the *Tractatus in Paulum* of Ambrosiaster, and which is so different from the method that Augustine used when under the influence of the sermons and the *Enarrationes* of Ambrose.

It is the purpose of this article to supplement Souter's volume on Ambrosiaster,⁶ and to supply a new proof of the great value of Ambrosiaster in the development of Christian thought during that period which was so rich in great religious writers and so miserable for its tragic political events.

Those who are familiar with the books of Augustine have noticed the great change that his thought underwent between the years 396 and 397.⁷ In his book *De libero Arbitrio* (394-395) Augustine thinks of the

⁵ For instance, Ps. 495: "'Iniquitas calcanei mei circumdabit me.' Hoc est iniquitas Aadae non mea. Sed ea non potest mihi esse terrori; in die enim iudicii, nostra in nobis non alienae iniquitatis flagitia puniuntur, unde reor iniquitatem calcanei magis lubricam delinquendi, quam rectum aliquem nostri esse delicti." Ambrose, Comm. in Paul. III (Edition by Ballerini, Milan, 1876).

⁶ A. Souter: *A Study of Ambrosiaster; Texts and Studies*, VII, 4. Cambridge, 1905. Souter has already published a good edition of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* of Ambrosiaster in the *Corpus Scrip. Eccl. Lat.* of Vienna. A new edition of the Pauline Comment is announced by Brewer.

I believe that Augustine did not know the *Quaestiones* at all. The passage of the *Quaest. XIX* is insufficient to prove such knowledge in Augustine. *Quaest. XXIII*, about the possibility of a material transmission of the soul through the act of generation, is in open contradiction to the thought of Augustine.

⁷ I follow here the chronology of Augustinian writings as given by Rottmanner. On this evolution of Augustinian thought, see Turmel: *Histoire du dogme du péché originel*. Macon, 1904, 73.

organism of Adam and Eve in Eden as of ethereal substances, which were transformed into bodies of flesh because of their disobedience. The consequences of their fault were death, ignorance, and the body itself—"mortales et ignari et carne subditi" (III, 54). Furthermore he does not assume that the traducianistic system is the best explanation of the origin of the human soul; on the contrary he insinuates, in a rather indefinite way, that original sin alone is not a sufficient cause for a man, otherwise innocent, to be condemned for ever (III, 66).

To this moment Augustine, still under the strong influence of Neoplatonic philosophy and of Ambrose's thought, conceives of the nature of Adam and Eve before the sin as of an impalpable and ethereal nature, and of our body as a consequence of the sin; in other words he thinks that sin brought an organic modification in the human being and not a helpless perversion of a fleshly organism already in existence. But afterwards Augustine does not wish to teach, as he did before, that men after the sin were "carne subditi," but that they became "concupiscentiae subditi." At first sight it seems that the first and older opinion was more pessimistic than the second; but if we consider carefully we shall find that this is not true. The radical transformation of the human nature from an ethereal to a bodily substance possibly might have left intact in the human compound the capacity of the spirit to work for its rehabilitation. On the contrary, introducing into an organism, already material and fleshly, the incessant trouble of corrupted sensuality, the sin, in the new attitude of the Augustinian thought, effaces at once the very possibility of free will, which became slave of the evil. The old Manichæan spirit of hatred against human generation and the conservation of the race was thus still underlying the thought of Augustine.⁸

⁸ Augustine himself in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, XII, 30, emphasizes the legitimacy of his spiritual evolution.

His change of view about original sin is already effected in his writings of 396–397, which inaugurated his episcopal career in Hippo, namely the *De Divinis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* and the collection *De LXXXIII Quaestionibus*. From that time mankind appeared to Augustine identified with Adam, in his sin and in his condemnation. Original sin is then described as an infection which propagates itself from father to son through the act of generation, which being an act of organic trouble caused by the sin, is a sin itself and determines the transmission *ipso facto* of the sin to the new creature. The stigma of original sin is impressed upon the body of the human being through the persistent stimulus of an unreasonable sensuality, and it is equally impressed upon his soul, because—for the logical exigencies of the system—it is considered as transmitted with the body through the material act of generation and therefore guilty itself of the guilt of the first father. Mankind is thus an agglomeration of condemned creatures which cannot acquire any merit before God, and whose hopes for forgiveness and atonement are only in the benevolent grace of the Father and the infallible decree of his predestination.

“Ex quo in paradiso natura nostra peccavit, non secundum spiritum, sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una *massa lutī* facti sumus, quod est *massa peccati*. Cum ergo meritum peccando amiserimus, nihil aliud, peccantibus, nisi aeterna damnatio debetur” (*De LXXXIII Quaestionibus*,⁹ 9, 68, 3). . . . Tunc facta est una *massa omnium*, veniens de traduce peccati et de forma mortalitatis. . . . Sunt igitur omnes homines una *quaedam massa peccati*, supplicium debens divinae summaeque justitiae, quod sive exigatur, sive donetur nulla est iniquitas. A quibus autem exigendum est et quibus donandum sit, superbe judicant debitores; quemadmodum conducti ad illam vineam iniuste indignati sunt, cum tantummodo aliis donare-

⁹ In *Retractationes* (edition by Knoell in *Corpus Scrip. Ecc. Lat.*, XXXVI, 1, 26) Augustine says that his *LXXXIII Quaestiones* were revised for publication after his elevation to the episcopate, between 396 and 397.

tur, quantum illis reddetur" (*De Divinis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, I, 16).¹⁰

In these words we find clearly outlined the two fundamental ideas of Augustine in his anti-Pelagian struggle about grace and predestination in their relation to free will: the first, the conception of mankind as of a people condemned; the second, the idea of the initial movement of grace as of a free gift of God. Which one of these two ideas came first to the mind of Augustine?

Towards the end of his life Augustine himself, writing his book *De Predestinatione* to instruct his friends Prosperus and Hilarius, both Gallic, attributed a peculiar efficacy for the development of his thought to the words of Paul (1 Cor. 4 7), "quid habes quod non accepisti," etc. But we think that we do no wrong to the consistency of the great bishop if we assume that this later remark of the *De Predestinatione*, like the other in the *Retractationes* II, 1,¹¹ was determined by the peculiar way in which the problems of forgiveness and spiritual vocation were shaped in his mind during the period of the harsh polemics caused by his treatises to the troublesome monks of Adrumetum, *De Gratia et de libero Arbitrio* and *De Corruptione et Gratia*.¹² In reality the logical development of Augustine's system requires the priority of the idea of the radical perversion of mankind before the idea of its inability to merit restoration and salvation. The effort towards

¹⁰ Ambrose died April 4, 397, and was succeeded by Simplicianus. The treatise of Augustine must be assigned to that year.

¹¹ Augustine recalls in this passage, while writing to Simplicianus, how deeply influenced he was by the words of Paul (1 Cor. 4 7) when he felt in himself the harsh contrast between the notions of grace and freedom of the will. By the virtue of these words, he says, "vicit gratia Dei."

¹² Although there is no doubt about the sincerity of Augustine, yet sometimes his memory played him false. For instance, when in the *Retractationes* he speaks of his treatises written immediately after his baptism, there is some inaccuracy in the chronology which he gives. Timme, in *Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren nach seiner Bekehrung* (Berlin, 1908), claims to be the first to notice these inaccuracies, but the Maurin Editors had already remarked the fact in their Augustinian biography.

restoration and the gift of divine grace for that purpose presupposes necessarily the fall. Other of Augustine's writings confirm this conclusion. In fact the fundamental idea that recurs with remarkable frequency in those writings, especially those belonging to the hot period of Pelagian controversy (412-418) and of polemics about Predestination (426-429), is the appalling definition of mankind as a "massa peccati, massa luti, massa damnationis, massa damnata."

How did Augustine undergo this change in that decisive period of his life (395-396), and why was his thought modified so deeply? What influence of Christian writers, or what way of personal thinking, led him to such a pessimistic conception of original sin?

In the passages of the *Retractationes* where he speaks about his works of those years we may find perhaps, besides the intention of the author, some help toward a better understanding of the interior evolution of his spirit. In Book I, Chapters 23-25,¹³ he mentions that "adhuc presbiter" he wrote some comments on the Epistle to the Romans (about which he had already talked with several friends), under the title *Expositio quarundam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*. He confesses with a kind of regret that he was at that time unable to grasp the true meaning of the passage 7 14, because he did not dare to apply to the Apostle the qualification of "carnalis." But later he says, "lectis quibusdam divinorum tractatoribus eloquiorum, quorum me moveret auctoritas, consideravi diligenter, et vidi etiam de ipso apostolo posse intelligi quod ait: 'scimus quoniam lex spiritualis est, ego autem carnalis sum.' Quod in eis libris, quos contra Pelagianos nuper scripsi, quantum potui, diligenter ostendi." Finally he recalls

¹³ Before the end of the year 395. What Augustine says in these chapters coincides exactly with the contents of the book *De libero Arbitrio*, ended about 394-395.

that it was his intention to write comments on the whole Epistle to the Romans, but that he was overcome very soon "operis magnitudine ac labore deterritus."¹⁴

These words are very significant, and I wonder that they have been passed by without remark by the historians of the Augustinian system. They give us a clear statement of what happened. While Augustine was writing the last chapters of his *De libero Arbitrio*, he was led by talks with some friends to find a deeper meaning in the Pauline sentences of the Epistle to the Romans. Some passages proved to be very hard and inconsistent with his conception of spiritual life and of the elective power of the human soul. He tried to explain them in the best way, and attempted even a complete exegesis of the obscure Pauline Epistle. But he happened then to read a Pauline comment by an authoritative Christian writer, and while reading it he realized the difficulty of the work he had undertaken; yet, on the other hand, he found in those comments a new explanation of the mysterious words of the Apostle. From that source the mind of Augustine drew new light and under that influence his anthropological and soteriological system took a new direction. This change wrought consequences which were weighty for the development of the religious spirit of the Christian world. Who is this "tractator divinorum eloquiorum," who influenced so deeply the mind of Augustine in this very critical moment of great mental stress?

The first thing to notice is the idiomatic peculiarity of the phrase by which Augustine expresses the solidarity of all men in the sin of Adam—"massa damnata." To-day we take the word "massa" in its figurative rather than its original meaning, and therefore we fail to realize that in the use of it by Augustine there is a bold and

¹⁴ The fragment that survives bears the title, *Epistolae ad Romanos inchoata Expositio*, and was written also in 394.

original metaphor. "Massa" originally means only an indistinct amalgam of inorganic elements. Figurative language in its development is a good guide to discover the development of ideas. The point is this—who first used this metaphor, "massa," upon which we may say without exaggeration is built up the whole anthropological system of Augustine?

The dictionaries give us very little help in this regard. Besides the well-known meaning given to the word "massa" as a conglomeration of farms and rural tenements, which is common in the writings of mediæval authors, we find another meaning of the word in a passage of Orosius, which is not quoted by dictionaries. With reference to the sack of Rome in the year 410 he says that it was a riddle for the chosen people, like "ex magna massa frumenti grana viva" (Hist. adv. Paganos, VII, 39).¹⁵

In the Vulgate we find "massa" about a dozen times, only four of which appear in the New Testament (Rom. 9 21; 11 16; 1 Cor. 5 6; Gal. 5 9), where the correspondent Greek word is *φύραμα*.¹⁶ The meaning is in every case "paste," or an amorphous compound of inorganic or vegetable substances. That gives no clue for our purpose. In two of the four Pauline passages the word is used in the well-known proverb, "Modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit."¹⁷

Now it was only a commentator on the Pauline Epistles living in Rome under Pope Damasus (366–384), who made a paraphrase of the passage Rom. 5—"in quo

¹⁵ Tertullian too speaks of "massa frumenti." De Prescr. III, 9.

¹⁶ Originally "massa" must have been the transliteration of *μάζα* (barley bread), which probably was a word of Hebrew derivation. Cf. H. Van Herwerden: *Lexicon graecum suppletorium et dialecticum*. Lugduni, 1910, II, 909.

¹⁷ Jerome, who besides being a good translator, is, when he likes, a subtle critic, observes (Gal. 5 9): "Male in nostris codicibus habetur modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit, et sensum potius interpret suum quam verba apostoli transtulit; modicum fermentum totam *conspersionem* fermentat." Tertullian too in *De pudicitia*, quoting 1 Cor. 5 6, says "conspersionem." Cf. Rösensch: *Itala et Vulgata*. Marburg, 1875, 309.

omnes peccaverunt" — exactly with the figurative word "massa," and it was Ambrosiaster.¹⁸ He wrote:

"*In quo, id est in Adam, omnes peccaverunt.*¹⁹ Ideo dixit 'in quo,' cum de muliere loquatur, quia non ad speciem retulit sed ad genus. Manifestum itaque est in Adam omnes peccasse, *quasi in massa*; ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, quos genuit, omnes nati sunt sub peccato. Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex ipso sumus omnes."

It is well known that Augustine was acquainted with this Pauline comment and held it in great consideration as coming from Hilarius of Poitiers. In the *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* addressed to Pope Boniface about 420, Augustine, holding the opinion that the words "in quo" are to be related to Adam, writes, "Et sic Sanctus Hilarius intellexit quod scriptum est 'in quo omnes peccaverunt,'" and he quotes the passage above to the letter.²⁰

Is it not very significant that this metaphor "massa," brought in to express the idea of the original participation of mankind in the sin of Adam, is to be found here in a passage known and quoted by Augustine?²¹

As we stated above, the two fundamental elements of Augustine's thought about original sin and spiritual

¹⁸ It is known that Ambrosiaster, commenting on 1 Tim. 3, says about the Church: "Cujus rector hodie est Damasus."

¹⁹ The passage is invariably given by all the quotations of the New Testament prior to the Vulgate. See *Novum Testamentum*, etc., F. Wordsworth et H. White. Partis II, fasc. I, *Epistola ad Romanos*. Oxford, 1913, 85.

²⁰ This metaphor of "massa" is so characteristic that I think that Pelagius himself was acquainted with Ambrosiaster when he commented on the Pauline passage in the following words, quoted by Augustine in his *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, III, 5: "Iniustum est ut hodie nata anima non ex massa Adae tam antiquum peccatum portet alienum." I submit this remark to Mr. Souter.

²¹ The word "massa" is used three times by Optatus Milevitanus, edit. by Ziwsa, *Corpus Scr. Ecc. Lat.* XXVI. Twice (V, 9; VI, 21) the meaning has nothing to do with our purpose; the third time it is very significant. Speaking (II, 26) about the rigorous discipline imposed by Donatists upon the Catholics who had joined their party, he says that they made them "massam poenitentium." Augustine was acquainted with the work of Optatus or rather with its sources, but there is no reason to think of any influence from that side, because Augustine disliked Optatus, whose ideas on anthropological and political problems were very far from his own.

rebirth are the real and full responsibility of all human individuals in the sin of Adam, and the gratuitous character of grace. Now we think it right to assume that Augustine took from Ambrosiaster, with which he became acquainted in 395, the metaphor of "massa peccati," and from it, through a natural reference to the words of Rom. 9 21, "massa luti," from which the potter makes pots according to his will, Augustine drew the notion of the absolute and inscrutable freedom of God in electing his own people, the saints. Other passages which bear evident traces of the influence on the writings of Augustine of Ambrosiaster's comment, justify our assumption, and throw a new light on the question of the theological relations between Ambrosiaster and Augustine, which to this day has been superficially viewed by the historians.

An old and unsatisfactory article attributed to C. Marold²² affirms that Augustine shows plainly his knowledge of the writings of Ambrosiaster only from the passage quoted above on the interpretation of Rom. 5 12, and dubiously from another passage of the "De Peccatorum Meritis" (I, 11-15), where Augustine opposes the reading of Rom. 5 14 as it is given by Ambrosiaster. Souter²³ remarks that the assumption of Marold is very unsound, especially if we think of the extraordinary comprehensiveness of Augustine's theological work, but he does not point to any other passage showing dependence on Ambrosiaster. The alleged affinity between the definition of fornication given in Augustine's sermon 162 and a passage of Ambrosiaster on 1 Cor. 6 18, is very dubious, because this passage, which is lacking in some manuscripts, cannot be taken as authentic. Turmel²⁴ repeatedly says that the patristic knowledge of Augustine, very poor in

²² Der Ambrosiaster nach Inhalt und Ursprung, in Zeitschrift f. wissenschaft. theol. XXVI, 415-470. 1883.

²³ Page 8.

²⁴ Cf. Histoire de la théologie positive, 227. Paris, 1904.

the beginning of his theological career, was greatly enriched during the Pelagian controversy, and that as far as it concerns Ambrosiaster, Augustine knew it as a work of Hilarius, but very soon discovered his mistake and in his later writings carefully avoided making use of it. There is no serious basis for such an assumption. Augustine himself confesses in his *Retractationes* (I, 21) that because of his insufficient knowledge of texts he did wrong to Donatus, reproaching him for adulterating some biblical passages. Moreover he engaged in harsh polemics with Jerome for the sake of sincerity in regard to his comment on the Epistle to the Galatians. But in all his work there is no hint that he was ever aware of his mistake about Ambrosiaster; and such a gap, in so far as we may argue from the other instances, would lead us to think that he never doubted the Hilarian authorship of the Ambrosiaster comment.

As a matter of fact, the patient and detailed comparison of the Augustinian doctrines in their development during the Pelagian controversy, with the anthropology and the soteriology of Ambrosiaster, gives us the conviction that the Pauline comment of the latter underlies the arguments and the capital points of the Augustinian polemical writings. Furthermore, it seems to me that Augustine, far from repudiating Ambrosiaster's comment because he had become aware of the usurped Hilarian authorship of it, on the contrary, makes constant allusions to it when he invokes generically the authority of Hilarius against his adversaries. That may seem too much, but it is evident from the context of the passages themselves.

In the *Retractationes* (I, 23) Augustine reminds us that he was at first very unwilling to apply to Paul, already converted and called to the apostleship, the word "carnalis" of Rom. 7 14, and that afterwards he was persuaded to do so by the authority of a Christian writer

commenting on the passage. Now it is exactly in this passage of the Epistle to the Romans that Ambrosiaster not only applies to the apostle himself the appellative "carnalis," but also outlines some ideas which are of capital interest in the Augustinian controversy against Pelagius and Julianus. Notice, for instance, the following passage:

"Hoc est, conditum esse sub peccato, ex Adam qui prior peccavit, originem trahere. Adam vendidit se prior; per hoc semen ejus subjectum est peccato. . . . Homo fragilis est, et paterno subjugatus delicto, ut potestate sui uti non possit, circa obœdientiam legis. . . . Quid est enim subjectum esse peccato, nisi corpus habere vitio animae corruptum, cui se inserat peccatum, et impellat hominem quasi captivum delictis, ut faciat voluntatem ejus?"

I noticed already that the interpretation of the "in quo omnes peccaverunt" through the figure of "massa," suggested by Ambrosiaster, led Augustine to associate the passage Rom. 5 12 with the other passage Rom. 9 21, where there is the comparison of the potter, who "has power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor." Combining these two passages, Augustine formulated his doctrine of grace gratuitously given by God and predestination. This course of development of Augustinian thought is clearly shown in his letter²⁵ to the Roman priest Sistus (afterwards pope, succeeding Celestinus), who seemed to be favoring some doctrinal points opposed by Augustine, before Pope Zosimus had decided the question. There is in this important document a remarkable passage: "Ubi quia universa ista massa merito damnata est, contumeliam debitam reddit justitia, honorem donat indebitum gratia, non meriti prerogativa, non fati necessitate, non temeritate fortunæ." If we compare these words with those of Am-

²⁵ Number 194 of the collection. It was written in 418.

brosiaster commenting on the Pauline sentence about the potter—"Deus, cum omnes ex una atque eadem massa simus in substantia, et cuncti peccatores, alius miseretur et alterum despicit non sine iustitia"—we cannot fail to realize that the words of Augustine are the true echo of Ambrosiaster.

But there is something more. Among the various details of the anthropological doctrines of Augustine the most peculiar is his idea of free will. Free, according to Augustine, is not he who can choose between two acts morally opposite, but only he who accomplishes with delight the will of his master. In a remarkable chapter of the *Enchiridion*, written about 420, Augustine says:

"Liberaliter servit, qui sui domini voluntatem libenter facit. Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est qui peccati servus est. Unde ad juste faciendum liber non erit, nisi a peccato liberatus, esse iustitiae coeperit servus. Ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti obœdientiam."²⁶

Hence he emphasizes the necessity of humility because men by themselves are unable to accomplish anything but wrong and sin.

The thought of Ambrosiaster coincides with the definitions given by Augustine. In fact in his comment on Rom. 6 20 Ambrosiaster holds that to be free from God is to be slave of sin: "Manifestum est, quia qui liber est a Deo est servus peccati; dum peccat enim recedit a Deo, et fit sub peccato." Later, commenting on Ephes. 2 10, he too affirms that man has no merit whatever in accomplishing his salvation, and he speaks of the predestination of the saints with the following words, which remind us very closely of Augustine:

"Omnis gratiarum actio saluti nostrae ad Deum referenda est, qui misericordiam suam nobis praestat. . . . Ideoque non est gloriandum

²⁶ The same ideas reappear in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, II, 9, even in a more definite way.

nobis in nobis ipsis, sed in Deo qui nos regeneravit nativitate cœlesti per fidem Christi, ad hoc ut bonis operibus exercitati, quae Deus nobis jam renatis decrevit, promissa mereamur accipere."

There is a reasonable objection against this attempt to bring together Augustine and Ambrosiaster in a mutual dependent relation. Could he not have elaborated his anthropologic and soteriologic system directly upon the Pauline data, without any reference to the intermediate exegesis of the unknown Roman commentator? Such an objection would be valuable if the parallelism shown above were only representing some abstract coincidences in the writings of men working on the same topic. But in our case, the dependence of Augustine upon Ambrosiaster is proved by circumstances of fact, like the explicit quotation from the *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, the words of the *Retractationes* about the authoritative comment on the Pauline Epistles which gave a new direction to his own exegesis; and finally the method of interpretation peculiar to Ambrosiaster, a positive and realistic method which only from the year 396 becomes the method adopted by Augustine, against the one he had followed to that time under the influence of Ambrose.

The question now arises by itself, whether Augustine, when he refers generically to the authority of Hilarius against the Pelagians, is alluding to the Pauline comment, the supposed work of Hilarius, rather than to the other genuine writings of the Gallic bishop. There is no doubt that Augustine had in mind in those passages the Pauline comment. Quotations from Hilarius are not very numerous in Augustine, about twenty altogether.²⁷ Some of them have reference to Trinitarian doctrine, and they have nothing to do with our purpose. Others are second-hand quotations, like those in *De Natura et Gratia* 72, which are drawn from the *De Natura* of Pelagius himself, against whom Augustine argues in that treatise. Another

²⁷ See the indexes of the Maurin Fathers in their Augustinian edition.

quotation, which comes in several times and which seems to be made directly, is from the *Tract. super Ps. CXVIII*. Finally, Augustine more than once invokes the authority of Hilarius and Gregory of Nazianzus without a specific quotation of the passages alluded to. A typical instance will prove that this Hilarius in the mind of Augustine was the author of the Pauline comment known as Ambrosiaster. In the *Contra Julianum Pelagianum*, VI, 23, 70, Augustine remembers once more his mental evolution of the year 396, and he says that after long hesitation he was convinced that the word "carnalis" could be applied as well to the apostle, who wanted to express "gemitum sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium"; and he adds immediately, "Hinc factum est ut sic ista intelligerem, quemadmodum intellexit Hilarius, Gregorius, Ambrosius." The reference is undoubtedly to the interpretation of "carnalis" given by Ambrosiaster, and therefore the Hilarius invoked by Augustine here is but Ambrosiaster himself.

We think that the dependence of the Augustinian anthropology upon Ambrosiaster cannot now be denied, and that it will solve not only a literary problem. In a remarkable essay on Julian of Eclanum,²⁸ A. Brückner observes that in the Augustinian doctrine of sin several Manichæan survivals found place. As instances he refers first to the notion of the Not-being hypostatized and almost opposed to the creative principle; then to the idea of human nature as naturally wrong and to the diabolic origin of the sexual instinct. Although these specific instances do not betray a direct Manichæan influence, yet I agree that an exaggerated pessimism left its traces in the anthropology of Augustine. But I should like to point out rather the significant affinity of the Augustinian conception of man as the servant of goodness or of evil

²⁸ Julian von Aeclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre. Texte und Untersuch. XV, 3, 66-68. Leipzig, 1897.

according to his status of affranchisement, with the Manichæan doctrine of the elements of light destroyed by the king of darkness and his sons after the defeat of the primordial man and restored through “ἀσχησις.”²⁹ As a matter of fact, there are in the Augustinian notion some elements obnoxious to the real status of the human soul and its possibility of working out spiritual salvation, and these elements were repudiated by the Church. It is therefore not untrue to affirm that his Manichæan fellowship left in the mind of Augustine a pessimistic background which was unconsciously brought to light again by the fervor of Pelagian controversy. But the influence that led him from Platonic speculation and from the symbolism of Origen and Ambrose to a realistic point of view and a literal exegesis, was undoubtedly the influence of Ambrosiaster; to whom therefore it would be fair to do justice and to give some credit for his part in the system which gained for Augustine the name of “*Doctor gratiae*.”

²⁹ F. Cumont: *Recherches sur le Manichéisme: I, La cosmogonie manichéenne*, 19. Bruxelles, 1908.

PREACHING AND WORSHIP

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It is not with the details of homiletics that this paper will occupy itself—how to write a sermon or how to behave in church. These profitable lessons it will dismiss to the class-room or the Sunday School, and will then hold itself free to expand in joyous exaltation of the magnitude and dignity of the training requisite for the fit discharge of the highest duties of the ministry. Every ability which one brings to it may help—those of the carpenter and the goldsmith, of him that smootheth with the hammer and him that smiteth the anvil. But all powers and all training will adjust themselves to its main purpose, the curve of which is determined by its two foci—for every great process is not circular but elliptical—the foci of preaching and worship. Around these the details of a theological curriculum will revolve. The Pentateuch and the Synoptic Problem, the Nicene Council and the Social Settlement House, the Anselmic theory of the Atonement and the Malthusian theory of population, all will have in view their ultimate end of preaching and worship, and all will come bringing their gifts of gold, frankincense, and myrrh.

“The Country Parson,” says George Herbert, “preacheth constantly; the pulpit is his joy and his throne. . . . As soon as he awakes on Sunday morning he presently falls to work, and seems to himself so as a market-man is when the market-day comes, or a shop-keeper when customers use to come in.” This constant preoccupation with preaching as his great business and the eager anti-

cipation of it as a joyous opportunity, give the preacher a sense of the precious frequency of great occasions, when his hand is on the lever of life and his words have weight. Every such opportunity one who loves power will prize. In contrast with this, other holds of a minister upon his people show their meagreness. Social entertainments, musical services, political addresses, parish visiting even, offer the minister an immediate grasp, which must often be seized in order to get any grasp at all. But its immediacy is its value and its danger. These occupations, persisted in, dry up the springs of the minister's deepest helpfulness. Activities take with him the place of thought, and indiscriminate kindness of spiritual leadership. His devotion to kindergarten methods with his people blocks development for them also. They lose first appetite and then capability for growth; and if he awakes to the harm he has done, he discovers that the apostles were wise when they declared that it was not meet to leave the word of God and serve tables. He echoes regretfully St. Paul's lament, "I have fed you with milk and not with meat, for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able." A diet exclusively of milk results in softening of the bones. "Every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness, for he is a babe. But strong meat belongeth unto them that are of full age." The old proverb is true—"A house-going parson maketh a church-going people"; but though by frequent visits he may bring his people to church, he cannot keep them there unless he has something to give them after they get there. It is pathetic to see the search for spiritual nutriment which goes on all over the land. There are devout persons who wander from church to church and from one denomination to another, not because they are in religion light of love or whimsical of spiritual appetite, but precisely the opposite—because they cannot find plain food for their

souls. They ask bread, and are given a stone. It is little wonder that they soon come to swell the number of those good people outside the churches who constitute for many inside so puzzling a problem.

There is a common newspaper-fostered impression that people in modern times object to doctrinal preaching. This is, I am convinced, a complete misapprehension. They are, it is true, no longer interested in the kind of doctrinal preaching common in the days of our fathers. Doctrine whose necessity to conduct is not apparent they are inclined to disregard. An unorthodox believer of today does not reject the Nicene theology; he simply has no interest in it. But where theology can show itself fruitful, men welcome it eagerly. This is especially the case with the basic doctrines of God, Christ, and immortality. Wherever men meet for unrestricted talk — at the club, in the steamer's smoking-room, in the country store — the conversation is likely to turn in half an hour to some aspect of these great subjects; not indeed to these in technical form or as parts of a doctrinal system, but to some practical problem which has its roots in them. In case of the first the emphasis has changed. There are now comparatively few discussions as to whether there is a God. That is taken for granted. The question is not whether, but what? What sort of a Being is it that you God-believers set forth? And it is very apt to be the case that God is brought before His own judgment bar; that is, the reality of the type of God set forth is tested by its consonance with what approves itself as the Divine character. God must meet His own standards. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Is there a heart behind the power which is unquestionably behind the world? Is there a cosmic conscience? Does the Infinite exclude the finite; that is, is the Divine of a different pattern from the human, so that the human is the non-Divine? or must God be, even if more, at least as

much as the ideal man? Does the universal include the particular, so that God notes the sparrow's fall, or am I hidden from His view in the crowd of things and men? It is such questions as these that men are, often unconsciously, often shamefacedly, always eagerly asking. Especially at the present time do these questions press, when faith in the promises of the Bible is overthrown by the war-pictures in newspapers and magazines. What a mockery the childishly confident assertions seem! "They that seek the Lord shall not want any good thing. The righteous cry, and the Lord heareth, and delivereth them out of all their troubles. He keepeth all their bones; not one of them is broken; and none of them that trust in Him shall be desolate. The upright shall not be ashamed in the evil time, and in the days of famine they shall be satisfied. A thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand, but it shall not come nigh thee." Have these words today any meaning? that is men's fierce and bitter demand; and in spite of the idea that in the face of this crisis theology is helpless, it is only theology, that is, the knowledge of God, that can give an answer.

Or again, the doctrine of mediation—how largely that has defeated its own comforting purpose! Instead of interpreting God and clearing the way to Him, it has blackened His character into repulsiveness and blocked up the way. The necessity of a mediator as the pacifier of an angry God, who is to be appeased only by blood, the transfer of moral responsibility and its results from guilty to innocent, salvation as a forensic transaction rather than a state of character, and conditioned upon a belief in such a transaction—these caricatures of reality have shut up that approach to the Heavenly Father which the doctrine of mediation should have opened. How deeply men need to be prevented from throwing it away and religion with it, as many of

them do on account of this misunderstanding; need to have exhibited to them the precious reality underlying every one of these misrepresented steps! Jesus, the Mediator, as the ultimate medium of communication with God, blood as the historic symbol of life offered with pain, vicariousness, the precious involvement of the loving guiltless with the loved guilty, salvation as the inevitable result of like to like—these are significant and needful keys through which daily life opens up Christianity and Christianity opens up daily life. Through them a distant and hostile Deity is changed into a welcome and trusted friend. And for such change men, though they do not know it, are thirsting.

“How would our souls stand up, O Lord,
Erect and strong and free,
If we but knew the ample hoard
Of wealth we have in Thee!

“We do not need to sway Thy mood,
Nor beg of Thee to hear.
Ere our own mind has understood,
Expectant is Thine ear.”

But perhaps there is no subject on which doctrinal preaching is more welcomed than in regard to conditions after death. It is pitiable to see men running to learned theologians, to ministers with little learning, to trance-mediums, astrologers, to any and every body who may choose to set up a claim to know, in the endeavor to get a trustworthy peep behind the curtain of the future. Is there a life after death? Is knowledge of it possible? How is it related to this life? Does the eschatology set forth in the Bible depict it? Does science recognize or even permit it? What part in it does happiness or misery play? and are these retributory or arbitrary or inevitable? One might suppose that these questions would have little insistence until the pressure of advancing age

emphasized the necessity of an immediate answer. Yet the old are generally no more urgent for an answer than they are desirous of dying, and it is the young, eager for life and for all that it means, who are the more feverishly intent on peering into the future. It is they who from the midst of their tennis and their love-making, insistently but for the most part dumbly, beg, "Tell us what you know about this, not what your creed says. Yet how can any knowledge here be possible!"

I am sure we underestimate this deep, mainly unconscious, demand for doctrinal preaching. Where there is any one who can meet it, ten men of all kinds will take hold of the skirt of such a Jew and eagerly exclaim, "We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you." Preachers are apt to have a not sufficiently high estimate of the capacity of their people, but to put them off with practical directions or, worse still, the canned declarations of an institution or a creed. In their desire to avoid what is supposed to be the common danger of preaching over people's heads, they too often preach under their feet. One might almost say that the whole homiletic law is summed up in this—Be real. Preach nothing you have not yourself understood and which has not had value for you. Men will pardon the preacher simplicity, heaviness, even sensationalism, even learning, if his words convey the impression, "We speak that we do know and testify that we have seen."

How to secure preachers of such power and attraction is the problem for every church. The endeavor is sometimes made to solve it by having a class of specialists, who shall devote themselves to preaching, like the preaching Orders in the Roman Catholic Church. I cannot speak from personal knowledge of the success of the Roman Catholic experiment, and I do not know of any similar class among Protestant ministers. Re-

vivalists have a different function; for they aim not at the whole field of spiritual edification but at one part of it only. Here and there a minister will announce that he does not propose to make parish calls but will devote himself to his sermons. When a young man does this, it is almost always fatal to his success. For, costly of time as parish calling is, it is essential in order to give the minister the knowledge of men in general and of the particular people whom he serves. He needs to feel continually the pulse of humanity. It is for this reason that professors in colleges and seminaries are rarely good preachers, unless they have previously held parishes. Their trajectory is apt to be adjusted to the scholastic mind. Their sermons need more carpenters and washerwomen in them.

I doubt whether making preachers specialists will give wide effectiveness to preaching. Yet this is not saying that it may not be wise for a minister to lay his main emphasis upon it. He may well take St. Paul's estimate of the relative importance of the several functions of the ministry: "First apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers; after that"—how unexpected that so marvellous a gift should come so low in his list!—"after that, miracles; then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues." In his earnest coveting of the best gifts a minister may rightly desire to be a teacher and prophet. But he will do well to follow again St. Paul's directions and devote himself to the line of his special ability, whatever that may be; he that teacheth, let him wait on his teaching, or he that exhorteth on exhortation; he that ruleth, with diligence. This course is the most economical for the parish as well as for the minister. If the Sunday sermons are the glowing points of the week, it is unwise for the parish to nag the minister because they do not see him often in their houses. If he is a genius in managing the Sunday School and the

Boys' Club and is a radiating centre of good fellowship for the community, the parish must not complain if he has little to give them on Sunday. Instead of demanding of him to be a preacher, a pastor, an executive, a financier, a musician, an intelligence office, all in one, the parish would get better service if they would help him do that which he can do best, and not worry him or themselves because it is not something different.

It is sometimes supposed, not only by those who are not members of the Episcopal Church but by those who are, that that Church lays little emphasis on preaching. Yet in the Prayer Book preaching is continually placed on a level in importance with the administration of the sacraments. The Bishop asks the one who is being ordained priest, "Are you determined, out of the Scriptures, to instruct the people committed to your charge?" "Will you give your faithful diligence always so to minister the doctrine and sacraments and the discipline of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded?" And when the candidate has given assurances, the Bishop says, "Take thou authority to preach the word of God and to minister the holy sacraments in the congregation." In the Litany are the prayers, "That it may please Thee to illuminate all Bishops, Priests, and Deacons with true knowledge and understanding of Thy word, and that both by their preaching and living they may set it forth and show it accordingly." "That it may please Thee to give to all Thy people increase of grace to hear meekly Thy word." At the consecration of a church the prayer is offered, "Grant, O Lord, that by Thine holy word which shall be read and preached in this place, and by Thy Holy Spirit grafting it inwardly in the heart, the hearers thereof may both perceive and know what things they ought to do, and may have power and strength to fulfil the same." A rubric requires that there shall be a sermon every time the

Communion is celebrated: "Then shall"—not "may" but "shall"—"follow the sermon"; a rubric which is habitually disregarded, even by those who pride themselves on observing all the rubrics.

As we trace back, on the one hand, the service of preaching and prayer to the Jewish Synagogue, and, on the other hand, ceremonial worship to the Temple, we find the Ecclesiast comparing them and emphasizing the superior worth of that in which preaching bears a part: "Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God, and be more ready to hear than to give the sacrifice of fools."¹ In the opinion of the Psalmist the apprehension of God's thought is the most important avenue to the understanding of Him: "Thou has magnified Thy word above all Thy name."² It is interesting in this connection to note that the opinion of some modern writers is different. The *Tracts For The Times* says: "We would not be thought entirely to depreciate preaching as a means of doing good. It may be necessary in a weak and languishing state; but it is an instrument which Scripture, to say the least, has never recommended." And Paley, in his lectures to theological students, says: "As to preaching, if your situation requires a sermon every Sunday, make one and steal five."³

The depreciation of preaching came as an inevitable reaction from the excessive importance it had obtained among the Protestant churches after the Reformation, and especially among the Puritans, just as this was a reaction from the excessive development of ceremonial in the Roman Catholic Church. And yet that there is no necessary opposition between elaborate ceremonial and earnest preaching is shown in the missions of the Roman Catholic and Episcopal Churches. An "either, or" is always an unfortunate antithesis, because it finds little

¹ Eccles. 5, 1.

² Ps. 138, 2.

³ Both quoted in *Directorium Pastorale*, J. H. Blunt; pp. 99, 122.

place in life. When we are presented with two opposites and the demand "Which?" is made upon us, we generally and wisely reply "Both"; and both then generally approach within our grasp in greater or less degree. This is wise, because, as I have said, all the great thought-guided processes of life are not circular but elliptical. So here we find preaching calling to its brother-focus of worship. As the former appeals mainly to the intelligence, so the latter appeals mainly to feeling, and both are necessary to bring the human soul in its fulness before God. That this is being more widely recognized today than heretofore is shown by the growth of ritual in worship among those who, like the Congregationalists and the Quakers, have hitherto been most opposed to it. It is true that these have always had their special ceremonial, though it has been different from that of the historic churches; for to insist on a black coat and a voluntary prayer or a brown coat and a silent prayer, is as truly ritualistic as to require a surplice and a Prayer Book. Yet all the churches are now tending to adopt such forms of worship as bowing or kneeling in prayer, responsive readings, "Amens" or other participation by the congregation, the use of the Lord's Prayer and of chants in common, which until recently were confined to the so-called liturgical churches. The increased use of music and of flowers and other adornments of the houses of worship points to the need that is felt of kindling emotion in Divine service, of calling upon not only the soul but all that is within us to bless God's holy name.

Another cause of this tendency towards development of ritual is in the growing recognition of the corporate nature of religion and therefore of that worship which is its expression and its aid. Society in ancient and mediæval times was based on the idea of corporate relationship. The family, the tribe, the class, the State, were the dominant factors, while the individual had small

consideration and few rights. In the Renaissance the individual asserted his right to himself, and the upheavals which have since taken place in social institutions have been largely owing to efforts for the greater recognition of the individual. This is noticeable in religion. Before the Renaissance the fundamental relation of the soul to God was determined — so it was generally held — by membership in a church, while worship consisted in being present at acts of ritual. With the coming of the Reformation religion was adjusted more immediately to an individual basis. With Luther it emphasized the pronouns of the Bible: "Thou art my God"; "I will save thee." Personal religion, as it was called, pressed upon every one its imperative demand, "Are you a Christian?" and the answer to this must rest on conscious experience in feeling or will. With the last half-century, however, the world has been becoming more fully aware of corporate relationships. Science has been, unconsciously to itself, revealing the significance of the doctrine of election—that the chief conditions of life are not chosen but imposed. In the domain of mind it has been directing its research largely to those regions which are beyond the control of the will. The business of the modern world is carried on less by individuals acting independently and more by combinations, syndicates, institutions. So Protestantism has been awaking to the fact that man's relation to his fellow-man and to God is more than chosen and conscious; it is organic; and this type of religion therefore has been appealing through agencies other than the intellect and the will. Man and God are both found to be greater and more complexly related than had been supposed; and the soul, in its new realization of the Infinite, exclaims afresh with the Psalmist, "O Lord, Thou hast searched me and known me! Thou knowest my down-sitting and mine up-rising; Thou understandest my

thought afar off. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; It is high; I cannot attain unto it."

Such an attitude is worship. It is the response of the soul to the consciousness of being in the presence of God, its out-going into harmony with Him. To educe this is the aim of all the services of the church. And here is the difference between those churches which, like the Roman Catholic, regard ritual as an ultimate contribution to God, and those which regard it as useful but not ultimate. To the strict ritualist the acts of ritual are in themselves pleasing to God, apart from any effects they may have on men. To the utilitarian ritualist they are valuable—he might even venture to use the technical term "valid"—only by reason of what lies behind them—instruction, awakening, conviction, awe, fear, love. It is such spiritual motions which, he must believe, are pleasing to God; and any ritual whatever which is not accompanied by these is but as "sounding brass and as a tinkling cymbal."

There are many who hold that the function of ceremonial is wholly expressive; the soul is filled with these spiritual motions and desires to express them to itself and to God. Such psychology posits first the existence of these inward feelings and then their outward embodiment. Sacraments are thus "the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace." But this view, that the internal moulds the external, leaves out of sight that the external also moulds the internal. Polite manners not only express kind feeling but tend to create it. Military discipline not only springs from respect for authority and obedience to it but tends to beget the respectful and obedient spirit. So the bended knee and the uplifted cross, the marriage ceremony and the sacrament of bread and wine, not only utter the language of the soul but tend to create that of which they are the utterance. This is the fact upon which the High Church-

man of whatever church bases his ceremonial. "But if I have not these inward states to express"—objects the Low Churchman. "Perform these acts," replies the High Churchman, "and you will have them." It is a policy opening the door, on the one hand, to unreality and hypocrisy, and, on the other, to the broadening and deepening of the soul.

This separation from common things points to the side of the Divine nature which worship chiefly contemplates—the transcendence of God. It is the other focus—His immanence—which most deeply underlies preaching. The preacher endeavors to open the eyes of the torpid to discern the eternal lying all about in common things, which they think they understand. The Lord showed Jeremiah a basket of figs, and said to him, "Jeremiah, what seest thou?" and he, who thought he knew a fact when he saw it, answered promptly, "Figs"; but the Lord then proceeded to show him in this common object the whole condition of Jerusalem. Yet beneath the main part of the Old Testament there lies rather the conception of the Divine transcendence, waiting for the New Testament to reveal the other side of God's glory—His immanence. It is the earlier revelation which lends itself more directly to worship. Something of distance seems necessary to awaken the sense of wonder, awe, authority, gratitude for attention unmerited—or, as the theologians define "grace," favor to the undeserving—which constitute the soul's primary response to the consciousness of the presence of God. Worship therefore differentiates the sacred from the common. It establishes a difference between them in time, place, occupation, dress, manners. This important distinction is overlooked by those who oppose observing one day in the week as a Sabbath on the ground that every day should be a Sabbath; by those who would utilize church-buildings for concerts, clubs, picture-shows, picnics, and

other secular interests, because of enlarged public service; by those who object to a uniform for ministers because they hold to the priesthood of all believers; by those who decline to baptize their children because all children are children of God. Such positions assume that the particular is the denial of the universal; although, on the contrary, the universal is necessary to the particular, and it is through the particular that the universal is revealed. The minister differs from other men in dress and occupation in order to call attention, not indeed to a universal occupation, but to a function which is universal. The child is baptized not because the unbaptized are not children of God but to illustrate that they are. The difference then between common and sacred is but an extension of the difference between mine and yours. Wherever two personalities approach, there must be the recognition of that which belongs specifically to each, as well as that which they have in common.

It is this recognition of the specialness of God which worship emphasizes; yet wherever it is torn apart from its correlate — the community of man with God — dissected out and left bare, unreality must result and that inhumanity in the conception of God which is a denial of the truth of the Incarnation. St. Paul can find nothing but the majestic phrases of Hebrew poetry sufficient to express his feeling of the vastness of God above men: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor?" Yet almost in the same breath he can exclaim, "Abba, Father! The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." And as if the blessed intimacy needed expansion, he expatiates, "If children, then heirs; heirs of God"; and even, to put it on the highest plane, "joint heirs with Christ."

This feeling of the presence of God will shape in all its parts the service of the church. It will create a hush among the ebullient activities of life, so that laughter and loud talk will drop to silence on entering a church, not because they are wrong but because other feelings there claim way. It will make chat right and left with one's fellows before the service jarring, and the absence of it after service equally jarring. It will prevent minister and congregation from regarding the parts of the service other than the sermon as "preliminary exercises," and will estop him from sitting and fingering his sermon while the congregation stand and sing. Perhaps it may even prevent him from speaking of them as "the audience," and of the church as an "auditorium." It may affect the construction of the church-building; and instead of having the lines of attention converge upon the minister or the choir just behind him, the eye will be led to an altar or communion-table or some other symbol of the central mystery of Christianity. It will mould the sermon. Not that it will banish all forms of it but one, but it will make the ultimate aim of all forms the same — to awaken in the soul a joyful upreach and a responsive "I will." To this end instruction may be necessary; but it will not be the object of the sermon, as it is properly of a lecture. For a sermon is, or should be, a poem, having its aim to arouse feeling. It will of course endeavor that the feeling shall not snuggle content with itself but shall be transmuted into inward action; as it was with the Psalmist, who declared, "Mine ears hast Thou opened," and then said at once, "Lo, I come to do Thy will, O my God!" Attitude in the soul comes thus to be regarded as of more importance than opinions or specific acts of the will, and the tone, the atmosphere, of a service more important than the ideas which are brought away from it. As one who has been busy with the interests of the world leaves a

church which is filled with this atmosphere, he is compelled to exclaim with the patriarch Jacob, "Surely, God is in this place, and I knew it not."

Can this worshipful attitude be taught? In spite of the opinion that the poet and the preacher and every kind of artist is born, not made, and that teaching here is futile, I cannot but believe that it is possible to teach much not only of the practice but of the spirit of worship. For this it will not be necessary to found professorships of ecclesiastical manners, though the etiquette-books have a function; but, here as elsewhere, the spirit of God, brooding upon that which is without form and void, will evolve order and beauty. And in judging results we must ever remember that there is no form of worship which is best, but that every form is to be judged by its efficiency, or, to use St. Paul's word, its capacity for edifying. For when he was regulating the irregular worship of the Corinthian Church, he announced as the true law of worship, "Let all things be done unto edifying." Does the ritual result in upbuilding? does it spring from and give rise to reverence, awe, joy, purpose, enlargement of soul, communion with God? Antiquity may be a precious element in it, as may be also its fitness to the immediate occasion. But its test will be not roots but fruits. "By their fruits," said our Lord, "ye shall know them." Edification can flow through utterly unlikely channels. Forms historically pagan may give rise to worship truly Christian, and ideas of God which, when logically faced, are shocking, when bathed in the mists of custom, may, in spite of their insecure foundations, become beams of the glory of God; as says the Psalmist, "He layeth the beams of His chambers in the waters." Yet because good fruit may sometimes defy logic and grow on poor soil, it does not follow that attempts to provide good soil are superfluous. Roses grew better in Sharon than on Mt. Carmel.

In considering what characteristics ritual should have in order to be edifying, we find three. First of all, it should be historic. Not that "as it was in the beginning" implies "is now, and ever shall be"; but the ritual should have its roots in the past, basing itself on the devotion of the ages, using to some extent their forms, their very words; otherwise it will smell of the paint. The hand of the adapter must not be seen, furnishing the house; for a ritual should have something of the permanence, the inevitableness, of a work of nature. If changed every week, it pleases only the inventor, and him not long. "Sir," says the thirsty soul, "thou has nothing to draw with, and the well is deep." To feel oneself standing surrounded by generations of the past at their devotions is a step to feeling oneself standing in the presence of God; for the voice of the individual is then blended with that of all the generations in their rapt utterance, "Lord, Thou hast been our dwelling-place!"

The second characteristic of an edifying ritual is that it should include the individual element. All the great liturgies do this through their elastic admission of local variations. There are hardly two parishes in any church particular for uniformity where the service is exactly alike; and, more express than this, place, large or small, is always established for that distinctive field for individualism — a sermon. Further still, the attitude of the ritual to its worshipper must be not that of a master but of a servant; not "Here am I, established, divine, sacrosanct. Conform yourself to me," but "How can I best serve the multitudinous you?" The worshipper should feel himself not cramping his limbs into a mould, but expanding with a deep inspiration of the joy of existence. "I opened my mouth and drew in my breath, for my delight was in Thy commandments." He, or his representative — some committee, convention,

synod, or other establishing body—may pick and choose stones for their temple. Let them beware that it is not furnished and upholstered in the latest fashion; but let them also beware that they do not build the tombs of the prophets.

The third characteristic of an edifying ritual is that it should include not only the individual but the corporate element. It must ask not only a conscious response but an unconscious one. The primary predominant choice which utters itself in “I will” is the strongest of the bands of a man; but behind and around it are the cords which are tied to ancestry, education, custom, taste, belief, and by all these must worship draw the soul. While at one time it gives him the consciousness of standing naked and alone before God, at another it will make him feel himself tied in with the great mass of humanity and, through living in ways which are saving, moving on with it to salvation unconsciously and steadily, as the glaciers move. He is glad Jesus said that the kingdom of God cometh not with observation, but that the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself, so that a man may cast seed into the ground, and then sleep and rise night and day, and the seed will spring and grow up, though he knoweth not how. Something of this large, organic, cosmic character of religion must make itself felt in an edifying ritual.

The importance of preaching, on the one hand, or of worship, on the other, has been recognized in every age. The importance of both has been recognized more rarely. Their parity of importance found architectural expression in the church which George Herbert built at Leighton in Huntingdonshire; where, says Izaak Walton, “by his order the reading-pew and pulpit were a little distant from each other and both of an equal height; for he would often say ‘They should neither have a precedence or priority of the other, but that prayer and preaching,

being equally useful, might agree like brethren.'” Preaching and worship are the two wings by which the services of the church are uplifted from the ground and borne on swift and efficient flight man-ward and God-ward; like the cherub of whom Ezekiel said, “With twain he did fly.” Sermons which are not filled with reverence, ritual which is not revealing and edifying, both crawl. Only where each has the aid of the other does the service wing full flight toward heaven.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES. 13 vols. (Louis Herbert Gray, Editor; George Foot Moore, Consulting Editor.) Vol. X, North American. HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER, Professor of Philosophy, University of Nebraska. Marshall Jones Co. 1916. Pp. xxvi, 325.

In spite of the interest taken and the great advances made in recent years in the study of the mythology of the American Indian, no serious attempt has been made for a generation to give in a single volume a critical *résumé* of the whole subject. All students therefore will take up this volume of Professor Alexander's with great anticipation, and will be keen to see how he has understood his task and presented his material. From the outset it is clear that the author has conceived his problem very broadly, and has thus, by the inclusion of a variety of elements pertaining more to religion than to mythology proper, written a treatise on North American Indian religion as illustrated by mythology, rather than a critical study of the tales themselves; he has given more of an interpretation than a presentation of the facts. In his selection of a geographic basis of arrangement for the material, he has followed what is, at least for the present, probably the wiser course. In so doing he has adopted, for the most part, the accepted scheme of culture-areas into which the anthropologist divides the continent, the chief exceptions to this being the inclusion of the Northern Athabascans in the Great Plains area, and of the Southern Athabascans with the tribes of the Interior Plateaus.

The first chapter is devoted to the Eskimo, who, because of their isolation and peculiar environment, present features of great interest. The broad scope and descriptive method characteristic of the whole book, makes itself felt here at once, in that barely half the available space is devoted to the myths themselves, the remainder being occupied by historical details and general descriptions of Eskimo life and religious beliefs. Unfortunately, no attention is called to the really distinctive features of Eskimo mythology, which lie in its striking uniformity over great areas, its matter-of-factness, and its lack of the type of animal tales so characteristic of most other parts of the continent.

The two following chapters deal with the Forest Tribes: the

Algonkian and Iroquoian peoples of the Great Lakes and the North Atlantic States. In his treatment of this area the author has been more fortunate, and has given an excellent outline of the characteristic beliefs. The dualistic features of the culture-heroes are clearly brought out, and the order and dramatic quality of Iroquoian cosmogony is emphasized. We meet, however, with a tendency, shown pretty strongly throughout the volume, to make generalizations which are hardly warranted by the facts, and which therefore give the reader rather unfortunate impressions. Thus it is declared (p. 30) that *all* Indians have developed the theory of Platonic Archetypes, a statement which although perhaps true for this particular region, is certainly not so for the continent as a whole. It may also be pointed out that it is decidedly open to question whether the Siouan tribes of this area are "intruders," and that it is doubtful if many would accept the theory that Iroquoian mythology was merely a systematization of borrowed Algonkian elements.

The next group treated comprises the tribes of the Gulf region, of whom the most important in historic times were the peoples of Muskogean stock. Inasmuch, however, as this stock was very probably immigrant from the region west of the Mississippi river, it is hardly accurate to speak of them as "aboriginals of the soil." In this chapter attention is called to the increased importance of the Sun in ceremonial rites, and an outline is given of the Busk or Green Corn dance characteristic of the Muskogean tribes. In the cosmogonic tales a distinction is made between the former and the Iroquoian Cherokee and the Yuchi, in that the Muskogean tribes show more of a relationship than do the latter to the types of the Southwest.

To the very important area of the Great Plains, two chapters are given. The various deities and the ceremonials held in their honor are first described, followed by an outline of the Northern Athabaskan, Siouan, and Caddoan cosmogonies, a selection of tales of various types, and concluding with a consideration of migration legends. Selection from the large mass of material available for this region is difficult, but it seems to have been carefully done in this case, except that the Northern Athabaskan has been unduly slighted and the Pawnee given rather too prominent a place. In describing the Morning Star sacrifice of the latter, a parallel is pointed out in the human sacrifice practised by the Kandhs of India. The statement, however, that the victim in this case was always a virgin is incorrect, as persons of both sexes were sacrificed, the victims being either kidnapped or bought. Attention must also be called to the absurdity of the views put forth on page 126. It is, to say the least, unfor-

fortunate that the author should allow himself to trifle in this way, and seriously suggest that in the mythology of the Plains tribes we may see vague recollections of the glacial period, the mammoth, and sabretoothed tiger, or that the Messianic tales of bearded culture-heroes are but the dim remembrances of the eleventh-century Scandinavian colonies in Greenland.

The two following chapters are headed "Mountain and Desert," and under this caption all the peoples of the Interior Plateaus, together with the Athabascans of the Southwest and the Piman and Yuman tribes of California and Northern Mexico, are discussed. The inclusion of the Athabaskan, Piman, and Yuman tribes with the true Plateau peoples is unfortunate, inasmuch as they belong so much more clearly with the Pueblo groups of the Southwest. The tendency to draw far-fetched conclusions is here again shown in the suggestion that the episode of Coyote snatching the heart from a body about to be cremated, as told in a Yuman tale, is in some way related to the Nahuatl custom of human sacrifice. The mythology of the Pueblo group is next considered, but in a manner which again illustrates the disproportionate space given to religion and ceremonial as contrasted with mythology proper, for nearly a third of the chapter is devoted to this aspect of the subject. When at length the mythology is dealt with, attention is concentrated, and rightly, upon the cosmogonic tales, but it is unfortunate that no mention is made of some other classes of tales which are of great interest.

The Pacific Coast is treated in the last two chapters, the first dealing with the tribes of California and Oregon, the second with those of the Northwest Coast. In the former, in referring to the great linguistic diversity of the region, it is compared with the Himalaya, where a similar diversity is said to obtain. The comparison is hardly an exact one, inasmuch as in the Himalayan area, although dialectic variation exists, all the languages belong to two or three linguistic stocks, whereas in California the differentiation is one not only of dialects but of stocks themselves. It may also be noted that it is the Pomo, not the Hupa as stated, who excel in basketry in California. By some error in binding, the titles of plates XXVIII and XXIX have been transposed. The chapter dealing with the Northwest Coast tribes, like that on the Pueblo peoples, devotes too much space to matters outside the scope of mythology proper, about half the chapter being taken up with such topics as the Secret Society organization, ceremonials, and the Potlatch. As a result, the Raven and Transformer cycles, so characteristic of this region, are inadequately presented.

The notes, which have been placed in an appendix, are grouped under subject headings, such as monsters, ghosts, Sun and Moon, Corn Spirits, etc. This gives an opportunity for brief general discussions of the several topics, and is in many ways very convenient. In many of the notes, however, as in the text itself, the author makes sweeping generalizations which in many cases would not find wide acceptance, and in others are not in accord with the facts. Thus in note 30 it is stated that "the ritual of the ceremonial pipe or calumet, is the *most important of all* North American religious forms"; and in note 29 it is said that human sacrifice in one form or another appears in *every part* of aboriginal America—whereas as a matter of fact it is extremely limited in its distribution in the entire continent outside of Mexico. A selected bibliography is given, following the regional arrangement of the book. This is convenient, and with a few exceptions the references given are well chosen. In some cases, notably under Algonkian Tribes in Chapters II and III and the Northern Athabaskan and Siouan tribes of Chapters V and VI, there are several instances in which, in place of the titles given, more complete and modern sources might have been selected. Under the heading of Algonkian Tribes, of Chapters II and III, the inclusion of Iroquoian (Huron) and Siouan (Winnebago) material is hardly justified. The omission from the list of general works of Boas' critical discussion of North American Mythology, in J.A.F.L. XXVII, is also unfortunate.

Lest these various comments should seem too severely critical, let me hasten to say that weighed against the great general excellence of the volume, they are to be considered as distinctly of secondary importance. The task of presenting in any reasonable compass the mythology of the North American Indians is one of such difficulty, and one which demands so wide a knowledge not only of the mythology but of the whole range of American Anthropology, that the author deserves warm praise for the admirable manner in which he has accomplished it. Professor Alexander is by profession a philosopher, not an anthropologist, which probably explains why in this, his first serious undertaking in a subject which lies outside his own field, he has approached the matter more from the point of view of description and interpretation than from that of critical presentation. Having adopted the former method, however, one cannot help wishing that the evidences of transmission, in which Indian mythology abounds, had been more directly stressed, and the bearing of these facts on the growth of mythology in general had been made more clear. The author has, however, made a very

definite and valuable contribution to the literature on North American mythology, and in this volume, generously enriched by the publisher with a wealth of remarkably fine plates (many of which are in color), we have at last an account, entertaining in style and based upon trustworthy sources, from which student and layman alike may gain, better than ever before, a real knowledge of the mythology of the first Americans.

ROLAND B. DIXON.

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DER TEUFEL IN DEN DEUTSCHEN GEISTLICHEN SPIELEN DES MITTELALTERS UND DER REFORMATIONSZEIT. EIN BEITRAG ZUR LITERATUR-, KULTUR-, UND KIRCHENGESCHICHTE DEUTSCHLANDS. DR. MAXIMILIAN JOSEF RUDWIN. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1915. (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.) Pp. xii, 194. 5m.

Dr. Maximilian J. Rudwin, formerly of Purdue University, now of the University of Illinois, is favorably known to mediæval scholars through a number of recent researches on the German ecclesiastical drama, beginning with a paper published in 1913 on the prophet and disputation scenes in the Christmas, Passion, and other religious plays. He has now followed up these detached studies with a comprehensive monograph on *The Devil in the German Religious Drama of the Middle Ages and the Reformation*, which is indeed, as the subtitle indicates, a "contribution to the literary, cultural, and ecclesiastical history of Germany."

The book is divided into two parts, which, however, frequently overlap and supplement each other. The first part deals with the individual scenes of the various cycles of plays in which a devil or devils appear; the second part attempts to give a consistent and complete picture of the character of the mediæval stage-devil and his realm.

Under the first heading there are discussed such scenes as the following: the fall of Lucifer; the creation of man; the fall of man; the temptation of Job, and other so-called prefigurations of Old Testament origin; the adoration of the shepherds; the slaughter of the innocents; the death of Herod; the death of John the Baptist; the worldly life of Mary Magdalen; the public career of Christ from the temptation in the wilderness to the passion, the harrowing of hell, and the ascension; the foolish-virgins scenes; the Antichrist scenes; the contract with Theophilus and Jutta. The method applied by the author to all these different cases is the same—first, the biblical or theological basis of the underlying conception of each

scene is established; then the modifications of the scene in the various plays are traced, notably the constantly increasing accretions of farcical elements; and finally, a characterization of its common dramatic type is attempted.

It cannot be said that this discussion brings out anything startlingly new. But the author has certainly brought together a great mass of interesting material and presented it in an orderly and judicious manner. And this material makes it perfectly plain that the function of the devil in the mediæval religious drama was not only that of a comic counterpart to the solemnly heroic scenes and figures, but stood in the very centre of the action as one of the principal moving forces, although a negative one, in the work of redemption. It is a pity that in the Oberammergau Play this feature of the mediæval drama has been entirely obliterated. As a specimen of the author's good judgment may be cited his discussion of the chronological position given in the majority of the religious plays to the scene of the harrowing of hell.¹ According to the *Symbolum Nicænum*, Christ's descent into hell took place between the entombment and the resurrection; in most of the Easter, Passion, and Corpus Christi plays, it follows the resurrection. Most scholars have found an explanation for this curious deviation from the accepted dogma in the impossibility of representing Christ's soul upon the stage without a body. Dr. Rudwin, more discerningly it seems to me, sees the explanation in the fact that Christ could not well be represented as victor over hell before he had appeared as victor over death.

The principal topics of the second part of the book are the hierarchy of the infernal realm; the constitution of pandemonium; the residences of the devils; their names; their various classes and callings; their language; their songs and dances; their intercourse with each other; their relation to God and mankind. Here again the value of Dr. Rudwin's observations lies more in their carefulness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness than in originality or critical acumen. Of particular interest is the chapter bringing out in detail the mediæval conception of the devil as "*Simia Dei*" and as "*Simia Christi*," and of Lillias, the devil's mother, as "*Simia Mariae*." The most illuminating chapter, however, seems to me the one in which

¹ It is to be regretted that the discussion of this scene is put at the very beginning, before the discussion of the Old Testament scenes, instead of connecting it with the other scenes from the passion. For although, in Dr. Rudwin's not altogether conclusive opinion, the harrowing of hell was the earliest scene in which the devil appeared on the stage, the arrangement in this chapter follows the order of biblical events, not the chronology of mediæval stage history.

Lucifer, the prince of hell, and his prime minister, Satan, are contrasted with each other—Lucifer, a hypochondriac, longing and wailing for his former angelic estate, nervous, capricious, sentimental, swaggering, a cowardly despot; Satan, ever active and optimistic, versatile, bold, full of fun, a loyal though misguided servant. The subordinate position of Satan as compared with the official status of Lucifer is very plausibly traced back by Dr. Rudwin to the Gospel of Nicodemus, where “*Inferus*” appears as Satan’s superior.

To sum up—Dr. Rudwin’s book is descriptive rather than analytic, statistical rather than historical. But it is a decidedly useful book. No one interested in the popular theology and demonology of the Middle Ages can afford to overlook it.

Two little details may be mentioned at the end. It is hard to see how the author can think (p. 51) that Satan in the John the Baptist episode of the Alsfeld Passion Play changes his disguise from that of an old woman to that of a prior, in the face of so obvious a correction of the text as Creizenach’s substitution of “*habitu priori*” for “*habitu prioris*.” The quotations from the *Zehnjungfrauenspiel* (p. 63) should have been from the edition of Otto Beckers, not from the older one by Bechstein.

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KUNO FRANCKE.

THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY. ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain. George Allen & Unwin. 1915. Pp. xi, 456.

The distinguished French sociologist, É. Durkheim, offers in this work an elaborate and painstaking analysis of the rôle which religion plays in human societies. Durkheim is already well known as the editor of *L'Année sociologique* and as the author of *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, *De la division du travail social*, and *Le suicide*, and as the leader of a brilliant group of sociologists whose influence has been increasingly felt beyond the borders of their own country. *La vie religieuse* is of profound interest to the philosopher, theologian, sociologist, and anthropologist. The author offers us an interpretation of religion, and he supports and illustrates that interpretation by an elaborate and penetrating analysis of Australian totemism. The noteworthy aspect of this most recent book of Durkheim is not that the author studies the social aspect and function of religious ideas and ritual, but that he undertakes in a radical and thorough-going fashion to derive every enduring and significant aspect of religion from man’s social experience. Until you can see the way

in which religious ideas and rites are thrown off by the mechanism of social contact, by the life of men in groups, you have no proper understanding of what anything religious means. This is what Durkheim in substance says. And, incidentally, once you understand these processes of man's social life, you will comprehend not only his religion but the fundamental categories of his thinking as well. But that is another story.

Before coming to his own definition of religion, Durkheim clears the way by a criticism of some of the more common definitions of religion. It is entirely inadequate to define religion in terms of the supernatural and the mysterious; the idea of the supernatural is but a late-comer in the history of religion. It is foreign to primitive peoples as well as to the lower levels of culture. Nor is the idea of divinity, of the gods or of God, any more satisfactory as an earmark of religion. There is no such idea in authentic Buddhism, and even in the theistic religions there are many rites which have nothing to do with a god. How then shall we define the essence of religion? Durkheim's answer consists of two parts. First, religion centres around a distinction between the sacred and the common. This distinction differs from that between the supernatural and the natural in that both the sacred and the profane fall *within* man's natural experience. But magic, as well as religion, makes use of the distinction between common things and sacred things. Another constituent of religion must be found which distinguishes it from magic. Religion is always an affair of a church, of a social community; magic is individual and anti-social. "There is no church of magic" (p. 44). This idea of a church is no incidental concomitant of religion; it enters into the very essence and definition of religion. The most important thing you can observe about religion is the way in which it both cements and also gives utterance to the collective life of some group. Combining these two essential elements of religion, Durkheim gives us the following definition (p. 47): "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them."

With this preliminary definition Durkheim next offers a trenchant criticism of two traditional conceptions of religion, animism and naturism. He contends that dreams cannot possibly account for the idea of the soul, that the phenomenon of death does not explain the transformation of a soul into a spirit, that neither the cult of the souls of the dead nor religious anthropomorphism at large is

primitive. Moreover, and more important, animism cannot be an adequate interpretation of religion, for it reduces religion to nothing more than a system of hallucinations. The author's words are worth quoting:

"It is inadmissible that systems of ideas like religions, which have held so considerable a place in history, and from which in all times men have come to receive the energy which they must have to live, should be made up of a tissue of illusions. Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and even scientific thought itself were born of religion, were for a long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated with its spirit. How could a vain fantasy have been able to fashion the human consciousness so strongly and so durably?" (p. 69).

The naturism of Max Müller does not offer any more satisfactory account of religion. According to it, religion is permeated with illusions and fallacies, and it is unable to account for the division of things into sacred and profane. Where animism and naturism fail, totemism succeeds. The greater part of *La vie religieuse* sets forth a theory of totemism, and its significance in generating and sustaining religious rites and beliefs. The following is a summary of Durkheim's views: Totemism stands for a form of tribal organization in which "the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically" (p. 150). The quality of sacredness—which is one of the two essential attributes of religion—attaches preëminently to the totem. This quality, like a subtle, impersonal force, also pervades the entire totemic group, composed of men and things. And totemism is in truth the religion of "an anonymous and impersonal force" (p. 188). This Mana—for such the anthropologists call it—is the essence and the vital principle which confers sacredness upon whatever comes in contact with it. To see the source of this idea of Mana is then to penetrate to the tap-root of religion. It is here that Durkheim is most bold and most original. The concept of an impersonal Mana, the force at once physical and moral which confers sacredness upon things and thus generates religion, is itself the creation of social pressure, of social contact and experience. Society alone, of all known empirical forces, has the power of "constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones" (p. 212). Religion is a symbol for the reality and the might of social forces. Society too is the literal object of religious worship; religion turns out thus to be no myth and no illusion precisely in so far as the collective life of man is no myth and no illusion. From this totemic principle, at once the giver of all sacredness and the

deposit of social experience, there is derived the idea of the individual soul, the ideas of spirits and gods, in short, all of the later religious concepts. The last part of the book studies the principal ritual attitudes involved in religion. Durkheim derives all religious rites from one and the same mental state and need: "In all its forms its object is to raise man above himself, and to make him lead a life superior to that which he would lead if he followed only his own individual whims. Beliefs express this life in representations; rites organize it and regulate its working" (p. 414).

In a brief conclusion Durkheim deals with some of the larger topics suggested by his interpretation of religion. It is to be hoped that he will return to these at greater length in a future study. He also here voices his hope for the future of religion in these noteworthy words:

"If we find a little difficulty today in imagining what these feasts and ceremonies of the future could consist in, it is because we are going through a stage of transition and moral mediocrity. The great things of the past which filled our fathers with enthusiasm do not excite the same ardor in us, either because they have come into common usage to such an extent that we are unconscious of them, or else because they no longer answer to our actual aspirations; but as yet there is nothing to replace them. . . . A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulæ are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of re-living them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by means of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits" (p. 427).

To criticise this book with any justice would be to trespass upon most of the live issues in contemporary philosophy so far as they touch the practical interests of men. That Durkheim's studies as sociologist and anthropologist have led him to see the full measure of religion in the achievements of primitive societies and to be relatively indifferent to the individual pole of human life, is perhaps to be expected. The thoughtful reader is not likely to find all his problems solved. Nevertheless he will be grateful for so comprehensive and masterly an indication of the intimate and still problematic relation between men's religious life and their social experience.

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THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE. LOUIS TRENCHARD MORE, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Cincinnati. Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. 268. \$1.50.

This is a critical review of present scientific tendencies, by a scientist. The value of such a book, except in the comparatively rare cases in which the author is both a scientist and a philosopher, lies in its selecting and presenting in comparatively untechnical form certain broadly characteristic instances of scientific method. The present book contains matter for critical reflection; and to have that matter so collected and summarized is of advantage both to the general reader and to the philosopher. But the author cannot be said to exhibit either originality or skill in his own criticism.

The book is a plea for a more rigorous positivism in science. Such a plea is timely in view of the present tendency among scientists to speculate on the ultimate constitution of matter. The new hypothesis of the electron, the conception of radio-activity, and the revision of the classic mechanics through the introduction of the principle of relativity, have led to such extravagances as Lorentz's attempt to conceive the ultimate substance as an electro-magnetic entity, or Einstein's hypothesis that length and time vary with motion. According to the author's view, it is both impossible and outside the province of science to conceive an ultimate physical substance that shall possess consistently and intelligibly all the properties that the most recent experimental discoveries require. Electricity is as impossible a substance as the earlier ether. The only hypothesis that has any virtue is the atomic hypothesis, and its only value is "to give a concrete, though crude, image of matter reduced to its simplest conditions." "The word electricity gives no such image of matter; it conveys absolutely no idea of materiality nor even of space or time relations."

It appears then that the author, after all, objects not so much to postulates that carry one beyond the data of experimentation as to those new postulates with which it is now proposed to supplant matter. He is not so much positivistic as conservative. In speaking of his own view, he says: "We have first postulated a real and objective universe, and assigned to matter rather than to energy the rôle of being an entity." He is not troubled by the fact that "the fundamental attribute of matter which makes it recognizable by our senses is force." In other words, although admitting that the phenomenon is force rather than matter, and that matter is thus a trans-phenomenal entity invoked for theoretical motives, he does not on that account hesitate to invoke it. He does not hesitate,

even though he has himself insisted on "the truth that we cannot attain any knowledge of things themselves but only of their attributes as they affect the senses."

Thus Professor More is not one of the radical positivists who would refrain from asserting the existence of anything that cannot be sensibly experienced, and confine science to the most economical possible description of the data of sense; but he is a positivist of the Spencerian, agnostic school, an old-fashioned relativist, who asserts the existence of an unknowable absolute. He does not escape the difficulty inherent in the agnostic view—how assert the existence of that of which we know nothing? Furthermore, it is inevitable that in such a view the agnosticism should annul the positivism. For if one can transcend experience in one's fundamental metaphysical assertion, why should science not hope to do likewise? And the mind which is convinced that reality lies beyond the range of perception or any mode of certain knowledge can scarcely be restrained from adventuring thither by the less trustworthy means of the imagination or the speculative reason.

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RALPH BARTON PERRY.

THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY. HENRY OTIS DWIGHT. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. vi, 605. \$1.00.

The Society was founded in the belief that the Bible is not only inspired but inspiring. The men who established it were confident that the book of itself, without comment, without the aid of preachers, was able to change the life of the reader and to save his soul. It had the independent efficacy of medicine; it needed only to be taken. They resolved to bring it within reach of every man. The first year they printed and distributed six thousand Bibles; the second year, seventeen thousand. With the third year they began to publish the New Testament separately: seven thousand copies of the Christian Scriptures, besides twenty-three thousand copies of the Christian and the Jewish Scriptures bound together. As the century of this publication ended, the report of the ninety-ninth year showed a sale of six million New Testaments over against three hundred and fifty thousand Old and New combined. These figures represent a lesson which the Society has learned by its experience. At the beginning the common theory was that the Bible is all valuable alike, being, as they said, the "word of God." It gradually appeared, however, as a matter of statistical fact that the New Testament is more valuable than the Old for the purposes of religion

in the proportion of six million to three hundred and fifty thousand; that is, the New Testament by itself is nearly twenty times as effective for the good of the soul as the Bible wherein the New Testament is encumbered with the Old. This is an interesting result of a hundred years of use of these books. If it had been foreseen, there might have been a lightening of the labors of some of the devout scholars who translated the Scriptures into the hundred and sixty-four languages in which the Society distributes them. It would have saved them from doing Leviticus and some other hopelessly local and obsolete books into Arapahoe, or Cambodian, or Esthonian, or Zapotec, or Zulu.

Another fact which this history confirms is that the Bible is a disturbing, dynamic, revolutionary book. The founders of the Society were lovers of peace, although it was noticed that the first meeting brought together "many of the most polemical theologians of the different denominations." They had no expectation of active resistance to their charitable work. But such opposition presently appeared; much of it in the foreign field where the Bible was a symbol of an intrusive religion, and was logically under the ban of the conservatives; but not there only. It was made plain that the Bible is essentially a Protestant book, individualistic, radical, in favor of changes in religion. The priest and the prophet represent each a permanent element in the spiritual life, but even a casual reader perceives that the Old Testament is mostly on the side of the prophet and against the priest, and that this is even more markedly true of the New Testament. The New Testament declares that Christ was crucified by priests because of his opposition to many of the things for which ecclesiastics chiefly cared. It reveals the Christian Church having its beginning in schism, and even after this beginning having for its chief minister and theologian an apostle who was frankly and eagerly proud of the fact that he was independent of the apostolic succession. Accordingly, the Bible Society found enemies everywhere among ecclesiastics. No priest of any communion could properly commend it to the perusal of his parishioners. Thus the distributors of the book entered into the perils of martyrdom at the hands of Christians as well as of pagans.

How these men and women met these perils abroad and at home, into what heroisms they came, what pains they underwent, what martyr-deaths many of them died, this centennial history tells. It might easily have been a dully pious record of statistics. Dr. Dwight has filled it with human interest. He has illustrated it with a thousand stories of adventure.

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THE COPTIC PSALTER IN THE FREER COLLECTION (Part I, Vol. X, Humanistic Series, University of Michigan Studies). Edited by WILLIAM H. WORRELL, Hartford Seminary Foundation. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. xxvi, 112. \$2.00.

In this excellent publication Dr. Worrell has edited the following texts from the Freer Coptic Collection: (1) an incomplete Psalter, i.e. considerable portions of Psalms (vi, 5–liii, 3); (2) a Psalter fragment (Ps. xliii, 25–xliv, 8; xlvi, 1–7); and (3) a fragment of the Book of Job (xxiv, 19–xxv, 3; xxvii, 10–19). All these documents, said to be of Fayyûmic origin, are in the Sahidic dialect. The Psalter manuscript, fully described in the introduction, is exceedingly interesting from a palæographical standpoint. Like most ancient manuscripts, it is undated; but on account of its resemblance to some Fayyûmic manuscripts, the dates of which are fairly well established, its date is presumed to lie between that of the London Sahidic Psalter (about 700 A.D. according to Budge) and that of the Berlin Sahidic Psalter (about 400 A.D. according to Rahlfs). The writing seems to show three distinct hands: A, B, and C. A is a round or Coptic hand, characterized by round forms of Alpha, Mu, and Upsilon; B is a square or Greek hand, having square forms for these three letters; C is a very small, regular hand, which has exceptionally long and upright stems to Alpha and Mu, and a Shima leaning backward. C is found only in the last five pages. Notwithstanding these differences, Dr. Worrell thinks it probable that the whole manuscript is from one and the same scribe. His opinion is well founded, at least as regards A and B, for these two, except for the three letters mentioned above, are identical. In fact the admixture of the square and round forms of those three letters does not necessarily point to different hands; there are other instances in which one and the same scribe used them alternately. Cf. Hyvernat's *Album de Paléographie Copte*, plate IV, no. 2 (vi or vii cent.).

The Freer manuscript presents some orthographic peculiarities, v. gr. : ı for  ı in words borrowed from the Greek;  ı for   ı,  ı for   ı,   ı for    ı in Coptic words. A more remarkable feature is the occasional doubling of   before initial vowels. This occurs not only for the particles   and   , but also for   ,    ,    ,    ,      , and     . It would have been well to bring this out more plainly in the edition, and divide thus:          ,          ,          , etc.

The text itself stands in very close relation to that of the other Sahidic Psalters, and only in a few cases does it seem to imply a

textual difference in the Greek. The strange reading περϣηστος (xvii, 51; xix, 7), which is found also in the Parham Psalter, is probably an itacism for περϣριστος. In xliii, 22 the manuscript has πετϣινε, whilst the other Sahidic texts have πετναϣινε in agreement with the Greek ἐκζητήσκει. It is interesting to remark that Lucifer of Cagliari (d. 371), quoting Ps. xliii, 22, in his work *Moriendum esse pro Filio Dei* (Migne, *P.L.*, vol. XIII, col. 1030), uses the present "requirit": "Si obliti sumus nomen Dei nostri et si expandimus manus nostras ad deum alienum, nonne Deus requirit ista?"

The edition of the Freer Coptic Psalter is a model of its kind. It reproduces the manuscript line for line as far as possible. The missing portions of the text have been supplied from the London manuscript and placed between square brackets; and, where the London manuscript is corrupt, from other sources indicated in the notes. The writer of this notice, having had the opportunity of collating many pages of the printed text with the photographs of the original, may be permitted to express his high opinion of the accurate and conscientious manner in which the editor has performed a most difficult task.

The Coptic character used in this edition was made under the supervision of Mr. J. W. Phinney of the American Typefounders' Company, from designs prepared by Dr. Worrell himself. It is clear, neat, and graceful, and represents intelligibly the square hand of the manuscript. This, we believe, is the first attempt to print Coptic texts in this country, and it is gratifying to see that the venture has been a great success.

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THE BEARING OF RECENT DISCOVERY ON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT (The James Sprunt Lectures at Union Theological
Seminary in Virginia, 1913). Sir W. M. RAMSAY. Hodder & Stoughton,
1915. Pp. xiv, 427.

This large volume is a characteristic book by Professor Ramsay, diffuse, encumbered by personal chat, often tedious in its looseness of construction, repetitious both within itself and in the use of previously published and familiar material, largely inconclusive; and yet possessing a real and captivating charm, and full of instruction. The title, like several of Ramsay's (or his publisher's) titles, promises more than the book performs, for the rather disconnected

chapters relate almost wholly to a few sections of the Gospel of Luke and the Book of Acts. The general purpose is to illustrate from contemporary history the fact that these New Testament books were written by an able historian possessing exact knowledge of the facts of the Greek world of the first century. For this Professor Ramsay is able to draw on stores of unfamiliar material, especially from inscriptions.

The most striking chapters are those which relate to the proconsul of Cyprus, L. Sergius Paulus (Acts 13 7, 12), and to the governor of Syria, P. Sulpicius Quirinius (Luke 2 2), both of whom will gain a new interest for any one who reads these pages. It appears that Sergius Paulus, a man of the highest Roman aristocracy, had a son who became governor of Galatia, and a daughter who, probably about 73 A.D., was married to G. Caristanius Fronto, a leading citizen of Antioch in Galatia. The glimpse gained here of the history of the Caristanii Frontones, a family of middle rank who had come from Latium to Asia Minor a hundred years earlier at the establishment of the colony, is in itself significant and picturesque; but Ramsay carries us farther by a startling although wholly undemonstrable conjecture. An inscription, namely, exists at Antioch in which the son of Sergia Paula and Caristanius pays honor to his father and mother, and, contrary to the usual custom, it is in Greek. That this Roman of high lineage should thus abandon the pride of his race in Roman ways and things, requires an explanation. May he not have sacrificed his public career and social position by accepting Christianity? If so, shall we not assume that he adopted the religion of his mother, who, through her father, might have come under the influence of the Christian faith preached at the proconsul's court in Cyprus by Paul on his first missionary journey? The confirmation this would give to the strange narrative of Acts 12 is plain, as is also the precarious nature of the theory.

Of the career of Quirinius Ramsay gives a spirited picture. From a comparatively humble origin in a small Italian town this able man rose by his merit and military capacity to the highest public positions, rendered great services to Rome, made a brilliant marriage (his wife was a great heiress and had been betrothed to Lucius Caesar, who died), and attained an eminence which was not wholly dimmed by a scandalous lawsuit brought by him against his wife after he had divorced her.

In Bible history Quirinius figures because of the statement of Luke that he was governor of Syria when the enrolment was made

for which Mary and Joseph journeyed to Bethlehem. That Quirinius was twice imperial legate in Syria is established by an inscription, and Ramsay now (perhaps rightly) dates the earlier service in the years 10-7 B.C., a result which (unlike Mommsen's date of 3-2 B.C.) brings it well within the period of Herod's reign. He has also called attention to many facts brought out by recent editors of papyri relating to Roman taxation and census-taking in the East. But, for the most part, the lengthy discussion of the present work merely repeats what had been said in the earlier book, *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* (1898), and not enough has been added to justify this reprinting of the former arguments in such fulness.

The facts and arguments themselves are interesting but do not carry us as far as Ramsay thinks, and do not meet all the difficulties which have led many older scholars to question Luke's statements. It is Sir William's habit to present arguments in which gaps unfilled by positive evidence are supplied by assumptions; and readers can seldom, even with the best will in the world, share the author's confidence in his own power of divination. His views are always suggestive, but it ought to be recognized that they are often unproved, and hence can never be safely adopted without rigorous and independent scrutiny of the evidence. It would be unfortunate if they should become part of the common stock of popular and supposedly trustworthy biblical knowledge. This trait, of over-confidence in his unproved hypotheses, seems to have grown stronger with Sir William's later writings, and it must be admitted that he is by no means the only recent writer on biblical subjects upon whom the same judgment is to be passed.

And yet, when all is said and done, Sir William Ramsay is a great scholar, using fresh material from inscriptions to build up a living image of the world of the first century, especially in Asia Minor. He has stimulated other men, has given a new impetus to scholarly work, and has shown continually in his books qualities of mind which are far superior to the merit of any one of those books in its entirety. The source of his high qualities is not his learning, extraordinary as that is, still less his fatal gift of combination; it is rather his power to know a real man when he sees him, and to make an out-of-the-way bit of history live once more as an integral part of a real world.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

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APOTHEOSIS AND AFTER LIFE. Three Lectures on Certain Phases of Art and Religion in the Roman Empire. MRS. ARTHUR STRONG. Constable & Co. 1915. Pp. xxii, 293. 8s. 6d.

The three lectures which this book contains were delivered in the fall of 1913 on the Charles Eliot Norton Foundation of the Archæological Institute of America, before some twenty-five centres of the Institute and before a number of universities and colleges in this country. Mrs. Strong has now published them in somewhat expanded form, beautifully illustrated by thirty-two plates.

As we should expect, the lectures deal quite as much with art as with religion, and Mrs. Strong's wide acquaintance with monuments makes it possible for her to draw from many sources for illustrations of her theme. Her well-known interest in Roman art appears in the introductory address to students, in which she calls attention to the new attitude toward the art of Rome, and expresses her satisfaction that scholars no longer regard the first three centuries of the Empire as a period of complete decadence, but rather see in it a continuous development from the art of Greece and the East.

In her first lecture on "The Influence of the Imperial Apotheosis on Antique Design," she treats the apotheosis of the emperors as a factor in bringing about a return in the fourth and succeeding centuries to a scheme of composition which she discovers also in early Greek art—that is to say, the deified emperor was made the central motif. His image or statue is represented with a frontal pose looking squarely toward the spectator, and all the other figures have a centripetal relation. A similar arrangement Mrs. Strong finds in early Greek art, where figures were apotropaic, as, for example, the Gorgon in the pediment of the early temple at Corfu, or where divinity was to be emphasized. In the great period of Greek art this earlier scheme was modified by the fact that the Greeks had a pantheon of Olympian gods, no one of which universally imposed his claim to supreme adoration and devotion. There was a lack of a central theme to concentrate the artistic impulse, with the possible exception of the pediment sculptures of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, for the exact arrangement of which we are unfortunately obliged to resort to conjecture. One may raise the question at this point as to whether Mrs. Strong in her discussion of the change from the centralized composition of early Greek art to the more narrative schemes of the great period, does not underestimate the desire of the Greek artist to attain action, ease, and fluidity of composition.

In Roman art the imperial apotheosis provided the central motif, and we find gradually developing in the first three Christian centuries

forms of design in which the emperor occupies the centre of the composition. In one sense this attains its complete form in the reliefs on the Arch of Constantine. Gradually Christ replaced the emperor, so that, in Mrs. Strong's view, the *majestas* of the deified emperor paved the way for the *majestas* of Christian art. On these matters others are more competent to judge than the present reviewer, but he cannot refrain from expressing in general his feeling that while Mrs. Strong's main contentions are good, she forces her evidence over-much. And this suspicion grows as he reads the rest of the book.

Lectures II and III deal with religious matters more strictly, for they are given to the "Symbolism of the After Life" and to "Roman Tombstones." The greater part, however, of the second lecture is devoted to tracing the origin of sepulchral imagery, and in the search we are carried back to Mycenæan and early Peloponnesian *stelae*. The historical survey occupies practically the whole of this lecture. The third lecture deals with the symbolism of the soul's apotheosis, with the eagle and the wreath which Cumont has shown are of Syrian origin, and with the Mithraic, Orphic, and Dionysiac elements which Roman tombstones in the Provinces especially exhibit. It is an interesting fact that there is comparatively little symbolism on Roman tombstones which can be connected with a belief in immortality until the end of the Republic; however, with the diffusion of a philosophy of religion which did not exclude at any rate a belief in immortality, and with the spread of Oriental doctrines, the symbolism of the future life becomes more common. But when Mrs. Strong (p. 202) sees in the representation of the story of Rhea Silvia and of Mars an allegory of death as a sacred marriage, we can hardly follow her. Her words,

"The Soul awakes to a vision of the divine, even as Rhea awakes from her weary slumber to behold the immortal lover swiftly descending to comfort her, for death is itself but sleep which leads to a blessed awakening and consummation,"

will hardly carry conviction to most students of her theme. She concludes with a discussion of an extremely interesting monument of the third century, still standing at Igel near Trèves, which should have careful consideration.

The three lectures as a whole contain a wealth of suggestive detail and deserve most careful examination; but at the same time, as the reviewer has already intimated, he does not find them wholly "convincing," if he may resort to a word drawn from the jargon of

literary reviewers. Over-interpretation, too subtle an imagination, and excessive readiness to combine things which are disparate, cause many blemishes in this book, for all its great learning.

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